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I.

Introduction

International law scholarship has long been obsessed with trying to explain and predict
why and when states comply with international law.1 Doing so, it has consistently
overlooked a logically preceding, but no less important, question: To what extent should
states perform their international commitments? Put differently, how strongly should we
protect and enforce international law? This question is normative rather than descriptive
in nature. It worries as much about over-enforcement of international law as underenforcement of international law.

For a system long plagued by claims of irrelevance, such inquiry has understandably been
somewhat of a taboo. Yet, with the habitual compliance of most states with most of
international law, the reliance on international law justifications even by the most
powerful states said to be in breach, and the recent strengthening of international law and
its enforcement in areas ranging from trade to the environment, this article is an attempt
to break this taboo.

In this article, I offer a theory of relative normativity driven by efficiency, effectiveness
and legitimacy concerns, rather than a hierarchy of values. According to this theory,
international law is best protected on a sliding scale between strict inalienability and
simple liability. From that perspective, both what I call European ‘absolutism’ and
American ‘voluntarism’ must be avoided as extreme and homogeneous normative
frameworks. Neither takes international law seriously enough. It is exactly because
international law has come to matter that we must fine-tune its normativity. Far from “a
pathological phenomenon”2 or threat to the integrity of international law, variable

1

See, for example, ABRAM CHAYES AND ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY:
COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AGREEMENTS (1995); Harold Koh, Why Do Nations
Obey International Law? 106 YALE JOURNAL 2599 (1997); Andrew Guzman, International Law: A
Compliance Based Theory, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1823 (2002); Oona Hathawa, Do Human Rights Treaties Make
a Difference? 111 YALE LAW JOURNAL 1935 (2002); Ryan Goodman and Derek Jinks, How to Influence
States: Socialization and International Human Rights Law 54 DUKE LAW JOURNAL 621 (2004); William
Bradford, In the Minds of Men: A Theory of Compliance with the Laws of War, 36 ARIZONA STATE LAW
JOURNAL 1243 (2004); JACK GOLDSMITH AND ERIC POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2005).
2
Prosper Weil, Towards Relative Normativity in International Law 77 AJIL 413 (1983), at 416.
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normativity is proof of a maturing legal system and a sine qua non for its long-term
survival.3

Rather than contenting themselves with the very creation of new rules, as difficult as this
may be, and blindly assuming that harder law is always better law, treaty negotiators
must consciously consider and decide how and how strongly to protect international
entitlements: What is the treaty’s optimal level of enforcement, what is the ultimate
objective of the treaty regime and, relatedly, its dispute settlement mechanism? Such
decisions ought to be a part of the design features of any new treaty.4 They must,
moreover, be carefully calibrated with reference to the special features of international
law, in particular, the problem of attracting participation and preventing exit, the absence
of centralized back-up enforcement and the demands of sovereignty and democratic
legitimacy. Account must be taken also of the nature and objectives of the new treaty in
question. In addition, optimal levels of protection for international law – be it at the
international level or before domestic courts -- can vary as between states (given the huge
inequalities and diversity of interests and priorities between them), as well as evolve over
time depending, for example, on whether higher levels of political support and
community permit, or call for, higher levels of legal protection.

Section II explains the generalized extremes of what I call European absolutism and
American voluntarism. I use these contrasting approaches to international law -portrayed as either a strict constitution or a flexible bundle of mere pledges -- as
signposts for a more balanced approach to optimal protection of international law. With
that objective in mind, Section III presents a more sophisticated version of international
law which makes distinctions between the allocation of legal entitlements, the protection
of legal entitlements and back-up enforcement. Within the second category (protection
of entitlements), Section III also introduces the difference, well-known in the United
3

As Ernest Young notes: “The point is to take international law seriously as law, by subjecting it to the
same sorts of institutional give and take that have characterized our domestic legal arrangements
throughout our history” (Ernest Young, Institutional Settlement in a Globalizing Judicial System, 54 Duke
Law Journal 1143, at 1259).
4
See, in support, Andrew Guzman, The Design of International Agreements 16 EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW (2005) 612 and Kal Raustiala, Form and Substance in International Agreements 99
AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2005) 541.
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States, between inalienability, property rules and liability rules as different levels or
degrees of protection for international law. Section IV describes how international law is
currently protected (lex lata) and illustrates, in particular, that the present level of
protection follows neither European absolutism nor American voluntarism. With the
limited exception of jus cogens, international law is not inalienable. Moreover, and
somewhat surprisingly for an inherently weak legal system, international law is, by
default, protected by a property rule, not a mere liability rule. Section V moves from the
protection of entitlements to back-up enforcement in case the rules of protection are
broken. It points at, and tries to explain, two glaring paradoxes in current international
law. First, although international law is more ambitious in its default level of protection
as compared to most domestic legal systems (property versus liability protection), backup enforcement in international law is actually weaker. Second, the entitlements that
international law protects most strongly (jus cogens and obligations erga omnes partes)
benefit from the weakest form of back-up enforcement. Finally, Section VI turns to a
normative assessment and provides a matrix of considerations and factors to consider (de
lege ferenda) when making decisions on what should be the optimal level of protection
and back-up enforcement for international law, including newly negotiated treaties.
Crucially, this matrix includes both the international protection of entitlements, and their
effect and protection in domestic law before domestic courts. Section VII concludes.

II.

European absolutism versus American voluntarism

Traditionally, two strands of answers have been offered to the question of how strongly
should we enforce international law? The first is what I call European absolutism or the
constitutional approach to international law which holds that, ideally, international law
should always be performed. The second, I refer to as American voluntarism, or the
contractual approach to international law, according to which international law is, at best,
a contract that can be broken with the payment of compensation.5

5

For a representative sample on the differences between Europe and America in their approach to
international law, see ROBERT KAGAN, PARADISE AND POWER, AMERICA AND EUROPE IN THE NEW WORLD
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The first group consists of traditional supporters of international law, haunted by the
critique that ‘their’ discipline has no teeth and is, therefore, largely irrelevant. In
response, and somewhat paradoxically, this group insists on the strictly binding nature of
international law (pacta sunt servanda) and portrays specific performance as the ideal or
optimal level of enforcement of international law.6 In the same spirit, this camp pursues
harder international law as necessarily better international law and advocates the
‘constitutionalization’ of international law as a source of supreme law that ties the hands
of governments to protect themselves against political, economic and other forms of
government failure. In sum, the normative position of this first school of thought is that,
ideally, international law should always be performed and complied with: the law is the
law. Though crudely generalizing, I call this the constitutional approach to international
law or European absolutism, both because of how the law of the European Communities
(EC) has been constructed (with direct effect and supremacy in domestic legal orders)
and because of how most European academics analyze and promote international law. In
addition, under civil law (prevalent in most European countries) the fall-back remedy for
breach is, equally, specific performance, not compensation. Many developing countries
have long sympathized with this approach as they tend to regard international law as an
instrument to level global political imbalances. From that vantage point as well, harder
law is often presumed to be better law.

A second group consists of traditional critics of international law who question the ability
of international law to influence the conduct of states. For this group, international law is
a patchwork of pledges or, at best, contracts, that states engage in as self-interested,
rational actors. Given the absence of centralized enforcement and the prevalence of state
sovereignty, the argument goes, international law cannot -- nor should it be -- fully

ORDER (2003) and JEREMY RIFKIN, THE EUROPEAN DREAM, HOW EUROPE’S VISION OF THE FUTURE IS
QUIETLY ECLIPSING THE AMERICAN DREAM (2004).
6
Recall that the (European) founder of international law, Hugo Grotius, largely equated the new discipline
with natural law. In his view, “[e]st autem jus naturale adeo immutabile, ut ne a deo quidem mutari queat”
(the natural law is so immutable that even God himself could not change it) (H. GROTIUS, DE JURE BELLI
AC PACIS LIBRI TRES, book 1, ch. 1, X.5).
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performed in all cases.7 Based on a cost-benefit analysis, this camp predicts that states
will only comply with international law if the costs of its defection (both in terms of
direct sanctions and broader reputational costs) outweigh those of compliance. Along the
same lines, the normative position of many within this second school of thought is that a
state should, a fortiori, only comply with international law if, overall, it makes people
better off. If a state can violate, pay full compensation to its foreign victims and still be
better off, then the violation should be permitted. What is more, as it improves overall
welfare, such ‘efficient breach’ ought to be promoted. From this perspective, full
performance is, therefore, anything but optimal performance. In sum, because of its
inherent weakness and the twin demands of efficiency and sovereignty, the best that
international law can and should expect, according to this second group, is protection
through a mere liability rule. Though, once again, crudely generalizing, I call this the
contractual approach to international law or American voluntarism both because of the
United States’ skepticism toward international law and its self-proclaimed strategy of
“coalitions of the willing”8, and because of the pervading law and economics or rational
choice approach in the US legal academy. In addition, in the common law (and in
contrast to civil law), the fall-back remedy for breach is, equally, expectation damages,
not specific performance.9

The point of this article is that both European absolutism and American voluntarism are
extremes to be avoided. Both offer valuable insights that the competing camp is not
always appreciating. At the same time, both are grounded too deeply in domestic law
analogies and overlook the specific nature and problems faced by international law.

7

Or as John Bolton put it: “claims that ‘international law’ has binding and authoritative force ultimately
ring either hollow or unacceptable to a free people” (John Bolton, Is There Really “Law” in International
Affairs?, 10 TRANSNATIONAL LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS (2000) 1, at 9).
8
See, for example, US Sees Coalitions of the Willing as Best Ally, Financial Times, 5 January 2005
(quoting a senior US State Department official as follows: “We ‘ad hoc’ our way through coalitions of the
willing. That’s the future”).
9
OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 236 (Mark D. Howe ed., 1963) (1881) (“The only
universal consequence of a legally binding promise is that the law makes the promisor pay damages if the
promised event does not come to pass”).
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III.

A more sophisticated version of international law:
Distinguishing allocation of entitlements, protection of
entitlements and back-up enforcement

The first issue which must be faced by any legal system is what Calabresi and Melamed
called the problem of ‘entitlement’.10 At the domestic level, a state is presented with the
conflicting interests of two or more people, or groups of people, and must decide which
side to favor. Does it grant an entitlement to make noise or an entitlement to have
silence; an entitlement to private property or an entitlement to communal property; an
entitlement to bodily integrity or an entitlement to rape or murder? Equally, at the
international level, rules of international law take sides in conflicts of interest between
nations. Like domestic law, international treaties and custom allocate entitlements to
pollute or to be free from pollution, entitlements to trade or to restrict trade, entitlements
to non-intervention or to respect for human rights. These are the first order of legal
decisions or what, in international law, are often referred to as primary rules.

Having made its initial choice, the next question is how to protect or enforce that choice.
Put differently, once an entitlement is set to, for example, silence, private property or
bodily integrity, the state must next decide how and how strongly to protect this
entitlement. In such second order decisions two questions must most commonly be
answered. First, can an individual sell or trade its entitlement? If not, the entitlement is
said to be ‘inalienable’. Individuals cannot, for example, sell their kidneys or sell
themselves into slavery even if they were willing to. Equally, minors cannot normally
contract their rights away. In case no such prohibition applies and an individual can,
therefore, validly transfer its entitlement, the following, second question arises. For the
transfer to occur must the holder of the entitlement agree or can anyone simply take the
entitlement and compensate for it? If the former is true – no one can take the entitlement
unless the holder sells it willingly – the entitlement is said to be protected by a ‘property
rule’. You do not have the right, for example, to take possession of my house even if you
pay the going rate for it. You can only have my house if I agree to sell it to you. If the
10

Guido Calabresi and A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One
View of the Cathedral, 85 HARVARD LAW REVIEW (1972) 1089, at 1090.
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latter applies – the entitlement can be taken or destroyed for as long as compensation is
paid – the entitlement is said to be protected by a ‘liability rule’. The state can, for
example, expropriate or take your land by eminent domain for as long as it pays you
compensation. Equally, when an entitlement to clean air is protected by a pollution tax, I
can unilaterally decide to pollute for as long as I pay the tax.

Although these second order concepts of inalienability, liability rules and property rules,
coined in 1972 by Calabresi and Melamed, are omnipresent in domestic (US) legal
scholarship, they are rarely addressed in international law.11 This article is an attempt to
fill that void. As a result, it asks the following basic questions:

(1)

Can states freely transfer their entitlements under international law or
should they at times be prohibited from doing so (making the entitlements
inalienable)? If so, when, why and how should such inalienability be
imposed?

(2)

Can one state simply take or destroy the entitlement of another state,
subject to compensation (liability rule), or should certain entitlements only
transfer if the holder willingly agrees (property rule)? In other words,
when, why and how should international law be protected by a property
rule? And when, why and how should international law be protected by a
mere liability rule?

What Calabresi and Melamed overlooked, however, is that a legal system cannot rest
once it has answered the second order question of how to protect entitlements. A third
and final question logically follows, namely: What happens if someone takes or destroys
an entitlement against the rules? Put differently, how does the state respond when
murder does occur, when I pollute but refuse to pay the pollution tax or when you take
11

For the rare exception, see Jonathan Wiener, Global Environmental Regulation: Instrument Choice in
Legal Context, 108 YALE LAW JOURNAL (1999) 677 and Warren Schwartz and Alan Sykes, The Economic
Structure of Renegotiation and Dispute Resolution in the World Trade Organization, 31 JOURNAL OF
LEGAL STUDIES (2002) 179.
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my house without my agreement? That Calabresi and Melamed did not ask this third
order question of back-up enforcement is easily forgiven. In domestic law, the state has a
monopoly on the use of coercive force and a variety of instruments in hand to compel its
subjects to comply with the rules. Depending on how and how strongly it decided to
protect entitlements, a state can seize my property when I refuse to pay taxes, it can fine
you for occupying my house and incarcerate, or even execute, the murderer. Under
international law, of course, the situation is different. States cannot be jailed, let alone be
executed. Moreover, when states refuse to pay compensation most of their property is
protected by sovereign immunity. As a result, states comply with the rules when they
want to, or when other states individually (through, for example, countermeasures) or
collectively (through, for example, UN Security Council Resolutions) lead them to
comply. This means that in international law the third order question of what happens if
entitlements are taken against the rules deserves attention. It even becomes crucial.

While focusing on the second order question of how international law protects
entitlements (through inalienability, property rules or liability rules), the trust of this
article is that, at the international level, any such attempt must be made in context.
Firstly, we must take account of the preceding step of how international law allocates
entitlements (essentially through voluntary assent which creates the problems of
attracting participation and avoiding exit). Secondly, we cannot loose sight of the next
step of how international law responds, or can respond, when entitlements are taken
against the rules (essentially through bilateral countermeasures and non-legal remedies
such as reputation costs and economic pressure).

My claim is that this interactive, three-prong analysis offers a welcome departure from
the increasingly hollow debate between the traditional critics of international law and its
usual supporters. The critics – labeled in this article as American voluntarism -- charge
that international law has no normative value as it is unable to put any significant brake
on a nation’s pursuit of self-interest. Indeed, whenever essential interests are at stake,
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states, especially the most powerful ones, do not feel compelled to comply with
international law.12

Traditional supporters of international law – labeled in this article as European
absolutism -- respond that international law is legally binding (pacta sunt servanda) and
renew their resolve to strengthen the normative pull of international law as much as
humanly possible. For both camps, it seems, law and normativity are homogeneous
concepts.

Acknowledging that law, even domestic law, comes in different shades – as in
inalienability, property rules or liability rules – moves away from the binary choice
between law and not-law. Indeed, the question of how or how strongly to protect
entitlements, addressed in this article, must be distinguished from whether or not
international law, or the rulings of international tribunals, are legally binding.13 When
asking how to protect an entitlement the question is not whether there is a legal right to
the entitlement but rather how strongly, on a sliding scale between strict inalienability and
simple liability, the system protects the entitlement. It is one thing to have an entitlement
or legal right, quite another to know how and how strongly this entitlement or right is
being protected.

By clinging to what they regard as the legal nirvana of full performance (pacta sunt
servanda), the traditional supporters of international law overlook that even in domestic
law most entitlements must not be sacredly respected. Even with the full force of
centralized enforcement available, domestic law deliberately chooses to permit the

12

JACK GOLDSMITH AND ERIC POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2005) 14-15. Or as John
Bolton put it more bluntly: “International law is not law; it is a series of political and moral arrangements
that stand or fall on their own merits, and anything else is simply theology and superstition masquerading
as law” (John Bolton, Is There Really “Law” in International Affairs? 10 TRANSNATIONAL LAW AND
CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS (2000) 1, at 48).
13
This is the question, for example, at the center of the debate between Judith Bello and Alan Sykes, on the
one hand, and John Jackson, on the other. Jackson argues that WTO rulings are legally binding under
international law, while Bello and Sykes take the view that they are not (for them, compensation or
suffering retaliation are legal equivalents to compliance). See, most recently, John Jackson, International
Law Status of WTO Dispute Settlement Reports: Obligation to Comply or Option to ‘Buy Out’?, 98 AJIL
109 (2004). For further discussion of this debate, see infra notes 91-93 and text at note 128.
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contracting away of most entitlements (that is, those protected by a property rule).14 In
addition, in a growing number of regulatory fields -- including, in particular,
environmental protection -- domestic law goes as far as allowing the unilateral taking of
entitlements subject only to compensation (thus protecting entitlements by a mere
liability rule). Most importantly, domestic legal systems permit such compensated
takings not for lack of enforcement tools, but because they regard such lower levels of
protection as more effective or efficient. In that sense, when setting the uniform target of
full compliance with all of its rules, international law tries to be ‘more catholic than the
pope’. Its paradoxical over-ambition in the face of obvious weakness begs for criticism.
By setting a standard that it cannot15 and, more importantly, should not always meet,
international law further undermines its already precarious credibility.

If international law is to further develop and to become more refined and sophisticated, it
must not merely attempt to create more rules (first order decisions), nor stare itself blind
at the lack of centralized enforcement (third order decisions). It must incorporate the
second order nuances common in domestic law and justified a fortiori at the international
level. Indeed, my claim is that at the international level there are additional reasons, not
present in domestic law (such as attracting and retaining participation, diversity,
legitimacy and sovereignty), to stop short of full performance with each and every rule.

For the critics of international law such nuanced approach implies that the lack of full
performance no longer undermines international law’s claim to normativity. Not because
international law, in the absence of centralized enforcement, ought to lower its
expectations, but because the normativity of international law, much like that of domestic
14

In the context of environmental protection, for example, Wiener writes that after thirty years of debate
and experience, analysts agree that “incentive-based instruments such as taxes and tradeable allowances
should generally be chosen over technology requirements and fixed emissions standards because the
incentive-based instruments are typically far more cost-effective and innovation-generating than their
alternatives”. Moreover, “among the incentive instruments, the price-based tax and liability rule
instruments – which set a price on emissions and let sources adjust the quantity they emit – will typically be
superior to the quantity-based tradeable allowance and property rule instruments – which set the quantity of
emissions and let the sources bargain over price”. (Wiener, supra note 11, at 682). On the benefits of
liability rules over property rules in terms of technological innovation for certain areas now covered by
intellectual property rights, see Jerome Reichmann, Of Green Tulips and Legal Kudzu: Repackaging
Rights in Subpatentable Innovation, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1743 (2000).
15
As Pascal famously noted: ‘Do not command what you cannot enforce’!
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law, is, and ought to, be relative. As in domestic law, in international law as well, it is
often times more efficient and appropriate to protect entitlements by a property or
liability rule rather than by inalienability.

Put differently, whilst both supporters and critics have traditionally worried about the
under-enforcement of international law or tried to explain why or predict when states
comply with international law (self-interest, domestic or foreign pressure, reputation,
institutions, ideas, normative pull, psychology or, most likely, a variable combination
thereof), this article takes a different track. It worries as much about over-enforcement as
under-enforcement of international law and tries to determine the different degrees to
which distinct types of international law ought to be performed or complied with.

Until quite recently such vantage point might have been preposterous. Yet, much has
changed since the end of World War II and the proliferation of international
organizations, treaties and international court and tribunals. In addition, the end of the
Cold War reinvigorated activity at the UN Security Council and facilitated broad and
deep coverage of new international mechanisms ranging from the WTO and bilateral
investment treaties to the International Criminal Court. In the WTO, for example, close
to 150 countries agreed to broad and deep substantive obligations (first order decisions)
as well as a quasi-judiciary with compulsory jurisdiction and possible trade sanctions to
enforce those obligations (third order decisions). This novel setting in world affairs calls
for pause in the international lawyer’s perpetual quest for further legalization, stricter
compliance and more forceful remedies. We can and must now afford the luxury of
taking the following, second order question, seriously: how strongly should we really
protect international law?

IV.

International law as it is currently protected: Neither
absolute nor voluntary

As a descriptive matter, or question of what the law currently provides (lex lata), both
European absolutism and American voluntarism are wrong. International law
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entitlements are not sacredly protected as inalienable (Section 1), nor simply protected by
a mere liability rule (Section 2).

1.

International law is, in principle, not inalienable

In contrast to the demands of European absolutism, most entitlements under international
law can be transferred, or contracted out from, at will and are, therefore, not inalienable.
What follows are the default rules of protection of international law16: First, States have
the right to amend treaties by agreement between the parties.17 Therefore, as between a
willing seller and a willing buyer, treaty entitlements can be transferred and are not
inalienable. Second, states are equally free to contract out of customary international law
(in particular the general law of treaties and state responsibility) when crafting new
treaties.18 As lex specialis such specific treaty provisions then prevail over the general,
fall-back rules of custom which are, therefore, derogable or supplementary, rather than
inalienable. Third, besides renegotiating the treaty itself or contracting out of custom,
states also have the right to settle specific disputes that arise under a treaty or custom.
Crucially, such settlements must not necessarily be fully consistent with the original
treaty or custom. As part of a settlement, the victim of breach can validly consent to the
full or partial continuation of the breach19 and/or waive its right to invoke

16

Subject to contracting out, jus cogens and the special regimes of so-called collective or erga omnes
partes entitlements discussed infra text at note 36.
17
Article 39 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT): “A treaty may be amended by
agreement between the parties”.
18
See, for example, Article 5 of the VCLT which applies the VCLT (largely considered to reflect
customary international law) to treaties adopted within an international organization “without prejudice to
any relevant rules of the organization”. See also Article 55 of the ILC Articles stating that the ILC Articles
(largely considered to reflect customary international law, at least in its main provisions) do not apply
“where and to the extent that the conditions for the existence of an internationally wrongful act or the
content or implementation of the international responsibility of a State are governed by special rules of
international law”.
19
Article 20 of the Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts adopted by the
International Law Commission in 2001 (ILC Articles): “Valid consent by a State to the commission of a
given act by another State precludes the wrongfulness of that act in relation to the former State to the extent
that the act remains within the limits of that consent”.
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responsibility.20 In sum, even under international law, full performance is not written in
stone. States can change the rules, consent to breach or waive their rights.

The only entitlements of international law that are inalienable are those protected by what
are called peremptory norms of general international law or jus cogens.21 The Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties defines these norms as those “accepted and
recognized by the international community of States as a whole as a norm from which no
derogation is permitted”. As is the case for entitlements protected by inalienability in
domestic law -- such as the prohibition to sell one’s kidney -- any treaty that conflicts
with jus cogens is void.22 Consequently, in international law, only entitlements under jus
cogens -- such as the prohibitions of slavery, genocide, aggression and crimes against
humanity -- are protected as inalienable and cannot be transferred even where both
parties agree. No definite and specific list of jus cogens norms exists.23 Yet, it is
generally agreed that norms are, in principle, elevated to jus cogens status based on the
important moral or ethical values that they protect.24

Finally, although a state may not invoke domestic law as justification for its failure to
perform a treaty25, nothing in international law obliges states to give effect, let alone
priority, to international law in their domestic legal systems. As a result -- although at the

20

Article 45 of the ILC Articles: “The responsibility of a State may not be invoked if: (a) The injured State
has validly waived the claim …”.
21
At some point, jus cogens (or at least part thereof) was even referred to using the domestic law analogy
of ‘crimes’ of state (ILC Draft Articles of 1976, Article 19, contrasting crimes of state with mere delicts).
22
Article 53 of the VCLT: “A treaty is void if, at the time of its conclusion, it conflicts with a peremptory
norm of general international law”. In addition, Article 64 provides: “If a new peremptory norm of general
international law emerges, any existing treaty which is in conflict with that norm becomes void and
terminates”.
23
For the very first explicit recognition of a norm as jus cogens by the International Court of Justice, see
Case Concerning Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (DRC v. Rwanda), Jurisdiction of the
Court and Admissibility of the Application, 3 February 2006, available at www.icj-cij.org, at para. 64
(noting that the character of jus cogens “is assuredly the case with regard to the prohibition of genocide”).
24
Prosper Weil, Towards Relative Normativity in International Law 77 AJIL 413 (1983) footnote 29
(“Such terms as ‘legal conscience of states’, ‘awakening of conscience’, ‘universal conscience’, ‘common
good of mankind’ recur like a leitmotiv on practically every page of the International Law Commission’s
work on the theories of jus cogens and international crimes”).
25
Article 27 of the VCLT: “A party may not invoke the provisions of its internal law as justification for its
failure to perform a treaty”. Article 46 offers the only exception to this rule. It permits states to renege on
a treaty that was consented to in violation of its internal law “regarding competence to conclude treaties” in
case such violation “was manifest and concerned a rule of its internal law of fundamental importance”.
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international level, international law is superior to domestic law -- at the domestic level,
states are free to give priority to domestic law, even to deny any legal effect to
international law altogether.26 From that perspective, as well, international law is not
absolute, nor even legally effective in those legal spheres that matter most, namely the
domestic, internal law of states.

2.

International law is, by default, protected by a property rule, not a
liability rule

If European absolutism is exaggerated, so is American voluntarism. Indeed, contrary to
the claims of American voluntarism, when it comes to the second order question of how
and how strongly international law is protected (to be distinguished from the third order
question of back-up enforcement in case the rules of protection are flouted), international
law represents far more than mere pledges. According to the principle of pacta sunt
servanda, “[e]very treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed
by them in good faith”.27 In addition, and quite surprisingly for a legal system without
centralized back-up enforcement, international law entitlements are, by default, protected
by the relatively strong regime of property protection, not the weaker regime of mere
liability. Put differently, as much as no one can take my house without my agreement, an
entitlement under international law cannot be unilaterally taken without the agreement of
its holder. Crucially, in both cases, this protection remains even if the taker fully
compensates the holder, that is, even if the taker pays me the going price for my house or
fully compensates the state for its entitlement to, for example, open trade or clean air. In
sum, unless there is mutual agreement, international law cannot be ‘bought out’.

More specifically, as regards past violations, or the retrospective protection of
entitlements in those cases where breach has already ceased, the fall-back principle in

26

In line with this flexibility, some states have a so-called monist regime (which automatically incorporates
and gives priority to international law over domestic law), others have a dualist regime (where international
law must be incorporated by parliament or congress for it to have domestic effect) and yet other states
operate under a hybrid or mixed system (automatically incorporating some but not all international law).
27
Article 26 of the VCLT.
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international law is restitution, not compensation.28 This obligation of restitution –
defined as an obligation to “re-establish the situation which existed before the wrongful
act was committed”29 -- is only absolved in case, and to the extent that, restitution is
either (1) “materially impossible”; or (2) “involves a burden out of all proportion to the
benefit deriving from restitution instead of compensation”.30 Put differently, where state
A confiscates the embassy of state B in violation of the rules on diplomatic immunity31, it
does not suffice for state A to pay full compensation. Unless such is “materially
impossible” or involves a burden for state A “out of all proportion” to the benefit for state
B, state A must hand the embassy back to state B. Efficient breach -- or deterring
compliance whenever its costs outweigh the benefits -- is, therefore, not the goal of
international law. On the contrary, most efficient breaches will not even be tolerated
since restitution that involves a burden with any degree of proportion to its benefits
remains mandated. Only if such burden is out of all proportion can the taker of an
entitlement rest with mere compensation.

Crucially, as concerns the future or prospective protection of entitlements in those cases
where breach continues, the fall-back principle is, equally, cessation of the breach and a
continued duty of performance. In other words, the obligation is specific performance.
Compensation does not suffice.32 Apart from consent or waiver by the victim of the
breach -- possibilities mentioned earlier in support of the proposition that international
law is not inalienable – there are, under general international law, no exceptions to this
obligation of cessation or specific performance.33 Put differently, while tolerance for
28

Article 35 of the ILC Articles.
Ibid.
30
Ibid.
31
Article 22 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations: “1. The premises of the mission shall be
inviolable … 3. The premises of the mission, their furnishings and other property thereon and the means of
transport of the mission shall be immune from search, requisition, attachment or execution”.
32
Article 29 of the ILC Articles: “The legal consequences of an internationally wrongful act … do not
affect the continued duty of the responsible State to perform the obligation breached”. Article 30(b) states
more explicitly: “The State responsible for the internationally wrongful act is under an obligation … to
cease that act, if it is continuing”. In addition, Article 30(b) even obliges the wrongdoing state “to offer
appropriate assurances and guarantees of non-repetion, if the circumstances so require”.
33
This strong presumption in favor of keeping treaties intact, and obliging performance with them, is found
also in Article 49.3 of the ILC Articles (even where countermeasures to induce compliance with an
obligation are permitted, “[c]ountermeasures shall, as far as possible, be taken in such a way as to permit
the resumption of performance of the obligations in question”) and in international case law (where courts
29
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certain forms of efficient breach could be read in the “burden out of all proportion”
language for the obligation of restitution, as regards continuing violations, efficient
breach is neither the stated goal, nor ever an excuse for violation. Unless otherwise
stipulated, states cannot, therefore, buy their way out of future performance. They must
perform their obligations.34

In sum, making abstraction of jus cogens and unless otherwise specified in a specific
treaty regime, international law is protected by a property rule, not a liability rule.

Finally, one precision must be added as regards multilateral treaties, that is, agreements
as between more than two states. Like bilateral agreements, multilateral treaties are, by
default, protected by a property rule.35 However, in such multilateral context the question
arises whether two parties to the treaty may agree to modify the treaty only as between
themselves (inter se), that is, whether one state can agree to transfer its entitlement to, for
example, clean air or free trade, to another state without the consent of the remaining
parties to the treaty? As entitlements under a multilateral treaty may be held collectively
by all parties (as in so-called obligations erga omnes partes36), instead of individually by
one state as against each other party (as in so-called reciprocal or bundles of bilateral
obligations)37, international law has limited the possibility for such inter se transfers or
contracting out. This, in effect, strengthens the protection of entitlements under
multilateral treaties as it makes it more difficult to change them or give them away.
According to the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, inter se modifications of a
multilateral treaty are only permitted if either (1) the multilateral treaty provides for such
possibility, or (2) the treaty does not prohibit the inter se modification, and the
and tribunals have been extremely reluctant to find the invalidity or termination of treaties, see, for
example, Alan Boyle, The Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Case: New Law in Old Bottles (1997) 8 YEARBOOK OF
INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL Law 13).
34
Articles 54-64 of the VCLT (on termination and suspension of the operation of treaties) and Articles 2027 of the ILC Articles (circumstances precluding wrongfulness) provide limited exceptions in this respect,
but have nothing to do with efficient breach or permitting compensation instead of performance.
35
The VCLT and ILC Articles apply to both bilateral and multilateral treaties.
36
Also referred to in Article 48.1(a) of the ILC Articles as obligations “established for the protection of a
collective interest of the group” of states party to the treaty (or, for that matter, bound by the custom).
37
On the difference between collective and bilateral obligations, see Joost Pauwelyn, A Typology of
Multilateral Treaty Obligations: Are WTO Obligations Bilateral or Collective in Nature? EJIL (2003)
907-951.
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modification neither “affect[s] the enjoyment by the other parties of their rights under the
[multilateral] treaty or the performance of their obligations”, nor “relate[s] to a provision,
derogation from which is incompatible with the effective execution of the object and
purpose of the [multilateral] treaty as a whole”.38

In other words, as collective or erga omnes partes entitlements are effectively held by all
the parties to the treaty (such as entitlements under most human rights or environmental
agreements), they can, in principle, only be transferred or modified by agreement of all of
its holders, not bilaterally as between two states only.39 In contrast, reciprocal or bilateral
entitlements -- even those set out in a multilateral treaty, such as the convention on
diplomatic relations or most trade agreements – can be transferred or contracted away
inter se unless such is either (1) prohibited in the treaty or (2) relates to a provision
“derogation from which is incompatible with the effective execution of the object and
purpose of the treaty as a whole”.

In sum, although both collective and bilateral entitlements benefit from property rule
protection, protection of collective entitlements is stricter and more rigorous than
protection of bilateral entitlements. As more states are holders of collective entitlements
their mutually agreed transfer becomes naturally more difficult.

38

Article 48 of the VCLT.
Bringing the obligation close to jus cogens status, Article 311 of the UN Convention on the Law of the
Sea (UNCLOS) goes even further and provides that “States Parties agree that there shall be no amendments
to the basic principle relating to the common heritage of mankind set forth in article 136 [declaring the seabed and ocean floor and subsoil thereof beyond the limits of national jurisdiction, including its resources, to
be the “common heritage of mankind”] and that they shall not be party to any agreement in derogation
thereof”. The difference with jus cogens is, of course, that Article 311 only applies to UNCLOS parties
whilst jus cogens by definition applies to all states. See also the 1997 UNESCO Universal Declaration on
the Human Genome and Human Rights, whose Article 1 declares the following: “The human genome
underlies the fundamental unity of all members of the human family, as well as the recognition of their
inherent dignity and diversity. In a symbolic sense, it is the heritage of humanity”.
39
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V.

Current back-up enforcement in case international
rules of protection are not respected

As pointed out in Section III, how and how strongly entitlements are protected -- as either
inalienable or by property or liability rule -- must be distinguished from what the system
does in case the rules of protection are not respected (back-up enforcement). Earlier, I
referred to this distinction as one between second and third order questions. I also
pointed out that whilst in domestic law back-up enforcement is a given (there is police,
bailiffs and prisons), in international law (which lacks central enforcement) the third
order question of back-up enforcement becomes a crucial part of the equation.

Logically, one would expect that higher levels of protection will also be backed-up with
higher or stronger remedies in case that level is not met. Put differently, the more
ambitious the goal, the more forceful the instruments to achieve that goal. This is exactly
what we see in domestic law. Where entitlements are (highly) protected as inalienable,
such as in criminal law, back-up enforcement takes the form of imprisonment, sometimes
even the death penalty. The next level of protection by property rule is, in turn, backed
up with fines coupled, if necessary, to imprisonment. Both go well beyond mere
compensation. Finally, in case someone takes an entitlement protected by a liability rule
without paying compensation, the holder of the entitlement can ask a court to objectively
value the required level of compensation and, subsequently, enforce payment, if
necessary with the help of bailiffs.

In international law, however, the situation is strikingly different, as we are faced with a
double paradox: First, although international law is more ambitious in its default level of
protection as compared to most domestic legal systems (property versus liability
protection), back-up enforcement in international law is actually weaker (Section 1).
Second, those entitlements that are most strongly protected (jus cogens and obligations
erga omnes partes) benefit from the weakest form of back-up enforcement (Section 2).
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1.

Although protected more strongly as property, back-up enforcement
of international law is actually weaker

As described earlier in Section IV, whilst default protection in many domestic settings is
mere liability, international entitlements are, by default, protected as property. This rule
requires, in principle, restitution and performance instead of mere compensation. Given
the inherent weakness of international law (in particular, the lack of centralized power)
this may come as a surprise. In the face of weakness, is international law trying to be
‘more catholic than the pope’?

Considering the next step of back-up enforcement, the situation becomes even more
puzzling. Though highly protected as property, in the event the rules of property
protection are flouted, international law offers only the type of back-up enforcement we
would expect for liability protection. Indeed, in case the taker of an international
entitlement protected as property fails to meet its obligation of restitution and/or specific
performance (that is, cessation of ongoing breach), the back-up is merely (1) reparation.40
If the wrongdoer refuses to pay reparation, and to separately induce specific performance,
the remedy of last resort is simply (2) proportional countermeasures.41 In case of
material breach of treaty, one may add (3) suspension or termination of the treaty by the
victim as against the wrongdoing state.42 However, genuine sanctions or punishment
either in the form of fines or punitive (even disproportional) countermeasures are
prohibited. Even the fall-back obligation of reparation is not backed-up with confiscation
as most state property enjoys immunity.

40

ILC Articles, Article 36.1: “The State responsible for an internationally wrongful act is under an
obligation to compensate for the damage caused thereby, insofar as such damage is not made good by
restitution”. More generally, Article 31.1 provides: “The responsible State is under an obligation to make
full reparation for the injury caused by the internationally wrongful act”.
41
ILC Articles, Article 49: “An injured State may only take countermeasures against a State which is
responsible for an internationally wrongful act in order to induce that State to comply with its obligations
under Part Two”, in particular, to induce cessation of the breach and payment of reparation. Article 51,
entitled ‘Proportionality’, limits such countermeasures to those “commensurate with the injury suffered,
taking into account gravity of the internationally wrongful act and the rights in question”.
42
Article 60 of the VCLT.
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In sum, international law sets for itself a level of protection that is higher than that for
many domestic law norms (property versus liability protection). Yet, the instruments to
achieve that higher level of protection (ultimately, proportional countermeasures) are
weaker than those available in domestic law. Put differently, notwithstanding its
weakness in what was referred to earlier as the third order question of how a legal system
responds, or can respond, when entitlements are taken against the rules, international law,
when answering the second order question of how strongly to protect entitlements,
paradoxically, decided to tighten those rules.

How can one explain this puzzle?

First, the fact that international law (as compared to domestic law) prohibits punitive
sanctions (i.e., offers a weak instrument of back-up enforcement) is easily explained.
States, including the most powerful ones, are hesitant to enter a regime with strict
remedies and tough punishments. Knowing that they may end up not only as
complainants but also as defendants, states want to maintain some wiggle room.43 Such
flexibility may be sought after as an exit option to openly violate the agreement in case,
for example, political circumstances change or, more likely, so as not to be hammered for
good faith implementation which turns out to constitute breach. After all, treaties are
incomplete contracts that cannot foresee all situations. They are also increasingly vague,
especially when multilaterally negotiated, so that states acting in good faith may
subsequently be found to violate the agreement.44 As a result, if international law were to
impose a back-up enforcement mechanism that is too forceful, it might either deter
participation in what is essentially a consent-based system or, for those who did join but
now face harsh penalties, may lead to exit from the treaty. In domestic law, neither the
front-end concern of attracting participation nor the back-end concern of avoiding exit
play a role: a domestic legislator rules by fiat and citizens cannot exit from specific rules.
43

GEORGE DOWNS AND DAVID ROCKE, OPTIMAL IMPERFECTION: DOMESTIC UNCERTAINTY AND
INSTITUTIONS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (1995).
44
As one WTO arbitrator noted: “In WTO dispute settlement cases, it is probably true that most defending
parties argue in good faith that they believed the measures at issue were in conformity with the relevant
provisions of the WTO Agreement” (Arbitration under Article 22.6 of the DSU, Canada – Export Credits,
para. 399).
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This makes it much easier for domestic law to have strict back-up enforcement as
compared to international law.

In addition, when it comes to the back-up enforcement of international law, weaker states
are in a particularly difficult predicament. On the one hand, they want stronger remedies
and treaties with real teeth, if not, powerful states may not comply. On the other hand,
weak states have historically faced ‘gunboat diplomacy’ and over-enforcement by
powerful states. As a result, they are the first ones to benefit from limits on the legality
of countermeasures and the requirement that countermeasures be proportional. In that
sense, the law on countermeasures is as much about limiting excessive self-help and
leveling the playing field between hugely unequal players, as it is about effectively
inducing compliance.

Second, the above reasons for weak back-up enforcement instruments do not, however,
explain international law’s paradoxically high goal of protection (on which more below,
in Section VI.2). Moving from the instrument (proportional countermeasures) to the
stated goal (restitution or specific performance), one explanation for international law’s
over-ambition could be overshooting. Let me explain what I mean by overshooting.

In the hope that more states will actually comply, international law may have raised the
bar in its official expectation of how strongly states ought to comply. Knowing far too
well that states cannot be forced into restitution or specific performance, international law
could be imposing its high level of protection in the hope that states will at least be
inclined to pay reparation. This would be like imposing a speed limit of 40 MPH hoping
that, since there is no real penalty linked to speeding anyhow, drivers will at least slow
down to 60 MPH. In other words, international law would then, by default and officially,
be protected by a property rule, but this only to achieve, in effect, the lower level of
liability protection.

Some evidence seems to support this view. After an extensive study, one author, for
example, concludes that “the award of remedies other than damages by international
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arbitral tribunals is extremely unusual”.45 The International Court of Justice, for
example, “has generally not made orders for specific performance or for restitution in the
absence of express provision for this in an agreement between the parties”.46

Yet, overshooting does not, in my view, tell the full story. It does not explain, in
particular, why most states do perform most of their obligations, instead of merely paying
compensation which, according to the overshooting argument above, would in effect be
the goal of international law. Indeed, if this allegation is empirically correct -- i.e.,
international law does generally meet its aimed-for high level of property protection -the question must be turned around: With so weak an instrument as back-up enforcement
– namely, proportional countermeasures – how does one explain that states so often do
comply with the rules?

In my view, the answer is that states perform their obligations, not only because they
want to or for fear of countermeasures, but also to uphold their reputation, for fear of
emulation and, in some cases, because they feel normatively compelled to comply. It is
not so much that states want to be seen as good citizens (an element that does play some
role). Rather, states comply with existing rules because they know that it enhances their
credibility when they make new rules.47 After all, who wants to make a deal with
someone who consistently flouts agreements? In addition, states realize that ‘you win
some, you loose some’. If you refuse to comply when on the defending side, why should
other states comply when you are complaining? In this sense, as in domestic law, actors
comply if only in the broader interest of stability and predictability. More generally,
45

CHRISTINE GRAY, JUDICIAL REMEDIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 12 (1987).
Christine Gray, Types of Remedies in ICJ Cases: Lessons for the WTO, in IMPROVING WTO DISPUTE
SETTLEMENT PROCEDURES 401, 404 (Friedl Weiss, ed., 2000). Or as the arbitrators in the Texaco v. Libya
case put it: “While the authors are unanimous, except one, in recognizing that restitutio in integrum
expresses, in international law, as a matter of principle the proper remedy to repair injuries by an unlawful
act, there are in fact many of them who declare that in practice restitution in integrum would only be
ordered in or be suitable to exceptional cases” (Texaco Overseas Petroleum Company/California Asiatic
Oil Company v. Government of the Libyan Arab Republic, Award of 19 January 1977, 17 I.L.M. 3 (1978)).
If so, the reasons why restitution or, for that matter, specific performance may not be “suitable” are
obvious. As one arbitrator put it bluntly: “it is impossible to compel a State to make restitution, this would
constitute in fact an intolerable interference in the internal sovereignty of States” (LIAMCO v. Government
of the Libyan Arab Republic, Award of 12 April 1977, 20 I.L.M. 3 (1981)).
47
Andrew Guzman, International Law: A Compliance Based Theory, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1823 (2002).
46
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states care about norms, ideas and the survival of international institutions at least for as
long as they make a net gain from membership. The United States will, for example,
hesitate to reject a WTO ruling out of hand as it may fear that doing so too often risks
undermining the legitimacy of the WTO itself, an organization and set of norms and ideas
that overall benefits the United States.

If these reputation and normative costs linked to non-performance are, indeed, real, they
may, firstly, explain why we witness so much compliance with international law even
though it is only backed-up by proportional countermeasures. Secondly, and perhaps
more importantly, with reputation and normative costs already weighing in, to go beyond
proportional countermeasures may lead to over-enforcement. In sum, with reputation and
normative costs entering the equation, proportional countermeasures may already achieve
optimal enforcement. For weaker states, this may offer a double victory: first, because
of the proportionality principle, powerful nations are prevented from excessive self-help;
second, with reputation and normative costs entering the game and particularly high
where a powerful nation drags its feet as against a poor developing country, proportional
countermeasures combined with reputation and normative costs may still induce powerful
nations to perform.

2.

Back-up enforcement of jus cogens and obligations erga omnes
partes is paradoxically weaker

In the previous section, I set out, and tried to explain, a first paradox of international law
enforcement as compared to the domestic protection of entitlements: Though protected
more strongly as property, back-up enforcement of international law is actually weaker.
In addition, a second paradox arises in respect of those entitlements which I described
earlier as most strongly protected in international law, namely entitlements collectively
held by the international community as a whole (jus cogens) or an entire group of states
(collective obligations or obligations erga omnes partes), referred to hereafter in
combination as community obligations.
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This second paradox can be summarized as follows: Although more strongly protected
as either inalienable (jus cogens) or difficult to transfer or to contract out from
(obligations erga omnes partes), back-up enforcement of community obligations is
actually weaker than that available under the default norm of property protection. Let me
explain why this is so.

As is the case for other international entitlements, back-up enforcement for community
obligations remains essentially limited to (1) reparation and (2) proportional
countermeasures. When it comes to “serious breach” of jus cogens -- defined as “gross
or systematic failure” to comply with jus cogens48 -- states also have an obligation to
“cooperate to bring to an end through lawful means” any such breach and not to
“recognize as lawful a situation created by a serious breach”, nor to “render aid or
assistance in maintaining that situation”.49 However, other than the UN Security Council
acting to maintain international peace and security, and enforcement regimes set up under
specific treaties50, there is no collective enforcement or punishment mechanism in
international law. Even collective enforcement by the UN Security Council is seriously
hampered as it is frequently paralyzed by the veto of one of the five permanent members.
Indeed, this is especially the case when the Security Council is faced with jus cogens
questions such as an alleged genocide or gross human rights violations (witness the
reluctance of Russia in the Kosovo crisis or the reluctance of China in the Darfur crisis).51

Moreover, it is not just that community obligations are, notwithstanding their higher goal,
backed-up by the same instruments as entitlements protected as property. The situation is

48

Article 40.2 of the ILC Articles.
Article 41 of the ILC Articles.
50
Such as the Kyoto Protocol or regional human rights conventions.
51
At the 2005 UN World Summit, the UN General Assembly did, however, make the following
commitments: “The international community, through the United Nations … has the responsibility to use
appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful means, in accordance with Chapters VI and VIII
of the Charter, to help to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes
against humanity. In this context, we are prepared to take collective action, in a timely and decisive
manner, through the Security Council … on a case-by-case basis … should peaceful means be inadequate
and national authorities are manifestly failing to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic
cleansing and crimes against humanity” (UN General Assembly Resolution, A/Res/60/1, 24 October 2005,
para. 139).
49
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worse than that. Back-up enforcement for jus cogens and obligations erga omnes partes
is actually weaker than the general rule.

First, given the inalienable nature of jus cogens obligations, states responding to breach
(including those specifically injured, say, the state victim of aggression) cannot engage in
reciprocal suspension of the obligation concerned, either as a countermeasure52 or in the
form of treaty suspension or termination.53 Where a victim of WTO breach can impose
reciprocal trade sanctions, a victim of aggression is not allowed to reciprocally invade the
original wrongdoer. Without such threat of reciprocity, the cost of defection obviously
decreases. Moreover, even if reciprocal suspension were permitted, for most violations
of jus cogens it would not offer much of an incentive to end the violation: Few states
would feel compelled to stop, for example, genocide because another state threatens to
commit genocide on its population. Equally, as obligations erga omnes partes (say, those
related to climate change or the high seas) are held collectively by all parties to the treaty,
their bilateral, state-to-state suspension would not only affect the wrongdoer but all
parties to the treaty. Because of these third party effects, the reciprocal suspension of
erga omnes partes obligations is, by default, prohibited.54

Second, even though all states (or all states part of the particular treaty or community)
have a right to invoke responsibility for breach of community obligations55, the very
nature of these obligations often means that no state in particular will actually invoke this
right and challenge the wrongdoer. This is because violations of jus cogens (say,
52

Article 50 of the ILC Articles, listing obligations that cannot be affected by countermeasures, including
obligations for the protection of fundamental human rights and obligations under peremptory norms of
general international law.
53
Article 60.3 of the VCLT, dis-applying treaty suspension or termination in response to material breach in
the case of “provisions relating to the protection of the human person contained in treaties of a
humanitarian character, in particular to provisions prohibiting any form of reprisals against persons
protected by such treaties”.
54
Article 49 of the ILC Articles stresses that countermeasures may only be taken “against a State which is
responsible for an internationally wrongful act”, not against third parties. Moreover, the bilateral
suspension of collective obligations would also violate the pacta tertiis rule (Article 34 VCLT and, for inter
se suspensions of multilateral treaties, Article 41.1(b)(i) VCLT, discussed supra text at note 37).
55
Article 48.1 of the ILC Articles: “Any State other than an injured State is entitled to invoke the
responsibility of another State … if: (a) The obligation breached is owed to a group of States including that
States, and is established for the protection of a collective interest of the group; or (b) The obligation
breached is owed to the international community as a whole”.
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genocide) or obligations erga omnes partes (say, those related to global commons such as
the ozone layer or the high seas) may not affect any other state in particular. Sometimes
they do not materially affect other states at all (as is the case when a government abuses
the human rights of its own population). This creates a collective action problem where
more often than not states are unwilling to bear the cost (both economic and political) of
enforcing an obligation that does not individually affect them. In this sense, the
difference between a common or public good and a good that does not belong to anyone
(i.e., between the ‘common heritage of mankind’ and res nullius) is small. In both cases,
no one may effectively protect the good.

Third, even if a state, not specifically affected, were willing to take up the role of
policeman in the collective interest, it can only request cessation and reparation.56 It is
generally accepted that under current international law, such policing nation -- unless it is
specifically injured (say, itself the victim of aggression) -- does not have the right to take
individual countermeasures. In other words, it cannot resort to the ultimate and most
important back-up enforcement instrument available for standard breaches of
international law.57 Knowing that for some violations no single state will be individually
56

Article 48.2 of the ILC Articles, with the limitation that reparation can only be requested “in the interest
of the injured State or of the beneficiaries of the obligation breached”.
57
Article 54 of the ILC Articles: “This chapter does not prejudice the right of any State, entitled under
article 48, paragraph 1 to invoke the responsibility of another State, to take lawful measures against that
State to ensure cessation of the breach and reparation in the interest of the injured State or of the
beneficiaries of the obligation breached”, underlining added. The reference to lawful measures is generally
understood as excluding countermeasures which, by definition, are unlawful but excused. In the ILC
Commentary to Article 54 (p. 355, para. 6), state practice is reviewed and the following conclusion is
made: “the current state of international law on countermeasures taken in the general or collective interest
is uncertain. State practice is sparse and involves a limited number of States. At present there appears to be
no clearly recognized entitlement of States referred to in article 48 to take countermeasures in the collective
interest”. Similarly, after an exhaustive review of state practice, another author concludes: “a close
examination of the cases … in which states seemed to be acting in the name of collective interests cannot
determinatively lead to the conclusion that there is an established customary or other rule of international
law permitting resort to such measures” (ELENI KATSELLI, COUNTERMEASURES, THE NON-INJURED STATE
AND THE IDEA OF INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY, 2005, at 277, DPhil thesis on file with the author).
According to Katselli, “states have been hesitant to resort to countermeasures whenever not individually
injured because they believed that they had an obligation to refrain from doing so … states not only have
been reluctant to clearly spell out that they were acting on the basis of a right under international law, but
they also stated that doing so would be in violation of international law” (ibid., p. 226). For a partially
opposite view, see CHRISTIAN TAMS, ENFORCING OBLIGATIONS ERGA OMNES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
(2005), 250 (finding, after an equally exhaustive survey of state practice that “it seems justified to conclude
that present-day international law recognizes a right of all States, irrespective of individual injury, to take
countermeasures in response to large-scale or systematic breaches of obligations erga omnes”).

28
injured (as in human rights violations), this, in effect, means that the back-up
enforcement of countermeasures is, for certain community obligations, not available at
all. The reason for this prohibition goes back to the power inequalities between states
and the fear of smaller states that the most powerful nations will engage in excessive
forms of self-help, in this case, even where they are not individually affected.58 Weaker
states must, therefore, balance the benefits of more effective enforcement of community
obligations, against the risk that the most powerful nations become the ideological
policemen of the world in the guise of individually enforcing obligations in the collective
interest.

In sum, community obligations in a system without community enforcement are doomed
to remain in “the world of the ‘ought’ rather than that of the ‘is’”.59 Even though more
states have the right to do something about breach of community obligations, in practice,
fewer states (if any at all) may actually take the initiative. Moreover, those who are
willing to act are deprived of the standard instruments of last resort namely both (1)
reciprocal suspension of the obligation breached and (2) individual countermeasures
(unless the state is individually injured by the breach). In this sense, community
obligations experience the worst of both worlds: They lack an effective communitybased enforcement mechanism (be it under general international law or specific treaty
regimes) and, on top of that, are deprived from the normal back-up of individual
enforcement, be it reciprocal suspension or countermeasures.60
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A similar reluctance to collectively enforce jus cogens can be found in the VCLT. Articles 65 and 66
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In many respects, and quite paradoxically, the actual protection of international
entitlements is, therefore, inversely related to how strongly international law aims or
pretends to be protecting the entitlement. As a result, stakeholders in regimes such as
trade or environmental protection who are normally anxious to elevate ‘their’ norms to
the status of community obligations in an effort to transcend the debasing tit-for-tat
horse-trading between states61, must realize what they are asking for. Taking reciprocity
away from a treaty regime without replacing it with a sufficiently solid community may
actually weaken rather than strengthen the effectiveness of the treaty.

The challenges set out above for the protection of community obligations – lack of
effective community enforcement mechanisms, the absence of reciprocal suspensions as
back-up, fewer, if any, states willing to enforce community obligations for lack of
individual impact, and the prohibition for states, other than the injured state, to take
countermeasures -- explain, at least partially, a broader paradox between domestic and
international law, one that could be referred to as a paradox of reverse priorities.
Consider the fields that most individuals would regard as prime candidates for strong
regulation, fields which are, indeed, most forcefully regulated in most domestic legal
systems: crimes, civil liberties, human rights, society-wide questions of security and
minimum welfare. Turn now to international law. Exactly those same fields are least
regulated or benefit from the lowest level of enforcement. Instead, the domains most
densely regulated and most effectively enforced at the international level are commercial
or reciprocal in nature: trade, finance, investment, intellectual property and other
standards.62 Indeed, not only the default rules of general international law offer what, in
effect, amounts to weaker protection for community obligations. In addition, even the lex
specialis enforcement mechanisms under specific treaties that set out collective
obligations (such as universal human rights conventions or multilateral environmental
61
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treaties) are generally weaker, not stronger, than mechanisms protecting and enforcing
what are essentially bilateral obligations (such as trade or investment agreements).63

VI.

A matrix to decide on how international law entitlements
should be protected

So far, I have focused on what current international law provides. More particularly, I
have explained, first, how international entitlements are protected (Section IV) and,
second, what happens in case those rules of protection are not respected (Section V). In
contrast to my caricature of European absolutism, only a very select group of
international entitlements are protected as inalienable (jus cogens). Moreover, unlike the
extreme of what I called American voluntarism, international law is, by default, protected
by a property rule, not a liability rule: Its goal is restitution or specific performance, not
compensation or efficient breach. In terms of the next step of back-up enforcement, I
pointed at, and tried to explain, a double paradox. First, although international law is
more ambitious in its default level of protection as compared to most domestic legal
systems (property versus liability protection), back-up enforcement in international law is
actually weaker. Second, the entitlements that international law protects most strongly
(jus cogens and obligations erga omnes partes) benefit from the weakest form of back-up
enforcement.

With this status of current international law in mind, this Section moves to the normative
question of what should be the level of protection and back-up enforcement for
international law (de lege ferenda), including for newly negotiated treaties. As pointed
out earlier, property protection is the default position of international law. Specific
treaties can, however, contract out of this fall-back rule and protect entitlements, for
example, by a liability rule. States must also consider when to elevate a norm to jus
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states.
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cogens status or to transform a treaty into one setting out what I referred to earlier as
collective or erga omnes partes obligations.

When deciding on which norms to protect as inalienable or by property or liability rule,
several factors must be considered. In particular, we can learn from analogies in
domestic law but must, in addition, take account of the peculiar nature of international
law, especially the absence of centralized back-up enforcement, the demands of
sovereignty and democratic legitimacy, the diversity and inequalities between states and
the problem of attracting participation and preventing exit. In sum, international law
must further, and more consciously, evolve in the direction of relative normativity driven
not only by values but also, and more importantly, by concerns of efficiency,
effectiveness and legitimacy. In this calculus both the protection at the international level
and the protection in domestic law and before domestic courts must be counted.

1. Why and when to protect international entitlements as inalienable or
collective obligations?

a.

Be careful what you wish for

Promoting a norm to jus cogens (thereby making it inalienable) or to collective obligation
status (thereby making its transfer more onerous) is a serious decision, with important
freedom restricting and back-up enforcement consequences. Yet, in international law,
little thought is given as to the specific reasons why, and the circumstances of when, such
decision ought to be made. Indeed, when it comes to jus cogens, current international
law offers no criteria at all, other than the tautology that jus cogens norms must be
“accepted and recognized by the international community of States as a whole as a norm
from which no derogation is permitted”.64 Equally, as far as collective obligations are
concerned, all we know lex lata is that they are “established for the protection of a
collective interest of the group”.65 In the absence of criteria and, worse, a decision-maker
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See supra note 22.
See supra note 36.
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with the power to decide which norm gets classified where66, there is not even an
accepted list of jus cogens or collective obligations. As a result, in many cases, states do
not even know which rules are at the pinnacle of legal protection. To make a domestic
law analogy, this would be like announcing the creation of a criminal justice system
without defining what conduct is criminal in the first place.

In practice, the decision to promote norms to jus cogens or collective obligations seems
to be based largely on the more or less subjective criterion of values.67 In other words,
norms that reflect values which the international community universally shares and
considers most important are prime candidates for promotion. As a result, advocates and
stakeholders of each specific sub-regime, be it human rights, environmental or health
protection, free trade, cultural diversity or IP, have clamored for ‘their’ norms – which, of
course, in their view, represent fundamental and universally shared values -- to be
upgraded.68 A crucial – though, in my view, mistaken -- assumption is thereby made that
promotion to community obligation automatically leads to better protection and
enforcement of the norm. Yet, as pointed out earlier, the opposite may well be true:
Although more strongly protected as either inalienable (jus cogens) or difficult to transfer
or to contract out from (obligations erga omnes partes), back-up enforcement of
community obligations is actually weaker than that available under the default norm of
property protection. To summarize the discussion in Section V above, even though more
states have the right to do something about breach of community obligations, in practice,
fewer states (if any at all) may actually take the initiative. Moreover, those who are
willing to act are deprived of the standard instruments of last resort namely both (1)
reciprocal suspension of the obligation breached and (2) individual countermeasures
(unless the state is individually injured by the breach). In sum, community obligations in
a system, such as international law, without community enforcement are difficult to
uphold. In other words, when advocating, for example, that environmental norms be
66
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regarded as jus cogens or trade norms be ‘promoted’ to collective obligations, be careful
what you wish for.

Without loosing sight of this paradox, which criteria should international law adopt when
deciding on making entitlements inalienable? Domestic law criteria -- such as those set
forth in Calabresi and Melamed -- are a good starting point, and are examined next (subsection b). Yet, in international law, the need to make entitlements inalienable must be
counterbalanced by a number of goals and principles (including the back-up enforcement
paradox just discussed) that are not present in domestic law. These goals and principles
are discussed at the end of this section (sub-section c).

b.

Domestic law analogies: Externalities, Moralisms and Paternalism

The starting point for any discussion on inalienability, both in domestic and international
law, is this: Any believer in individual freedom, or the freedom of states to set their own
destiny, ought to be weary of setting norms in stone, that is, of making entitlements
inalienable. Once labeled as inalienable neither individuals (under domestic law) nor
states (under international law) can change or transfer the entitlement. That is not to say
that no entitlement ought to be inalienable; only that the criteria for inalienability need to
be carefully scrutinized. To a more limited extent, the same caution ought to apply in
respect of collective obligations69: as they are, by definition, held by all parties to the
group or treaty, the transfer of collective entitlements can only occur when all holders
agree. As this restricts the contractual freedom of states, negotiators ought to think twice
before labeling an obligation as collective.

For Calabresi and Melamed, who invented the typology for domestic law purposes,
inalienability can be appropriate on three grounds: significant externalities, moralisms
and paternalism.

69

See supra note 36.

34
First, inalienability may be called for in cases where the transfer of the entitlement would
create such significant externalities -- that is, costs to third parties (as in pollution) -- that
no buyer would be willing to pay for them. In that case, “setting up the machinery for
collective valuation will be wasteful” and “[b]arring the sale [of, for example, land] to
polluters will be the most efficient result because it is clear that avoiding pollution is
cheaper than paying its costs – including the costs to [third parties]”.70 Put differently, as
breach cannot be efficient, one might as well ban it.

Second, in some cases “external costs do not lend themselves to collective measurement
which is acceptably objective and nonarbitrary”.71 In theory, one could value the external
costs to other people in society related to me willingly selling myself into slavery and
force the buyer to pay not just me, but also all third parties whose morals would be
harmed by seeing me as a slave. Yet, because we feel that any monetization of, for
example, freedom or a kidney is, by hypothesis, out of the question, most states decided
to make the entitlement to be free from slavery, or to our kidneys, inalienable.

Third, paternalism can make entitlements inalienable. Self-paternalism explains why
Ulysses tied himself to the mast or why individuals pass a bill of rights or constitutional
safeguards “so that they will be prevented from yielding to momentary temptations which
they deem harmful to themselves”.72 The same logic applies when making invalid
contracts entered into when drunk or under undue influence or coercion. True
paternalism, in turn, explains why we prohibit a whole range of activities by minors.

What can we make of these three reasons for inalienability – significant externalities,
moralisms and paternalism – as they might apply to international law?

Note, first, that all three are based on economic efficiency, respectively, the impossibility
of efficient breach, inappropriateness of monetization and long term benefits of handtying. As noted earlier, under international law, in contrast, the classification of norms as
70
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jus cogens is made predominantly, if not exclusively, with reference to values.73 If
anything, what are traditionally seen as jus cogens norms correspond to Calabresi and
Melamed’s moralisms. International law could then be said to ban slavery, genocide,
aggression and crimes against humanity as jus cogens because states consider it
inappropriate to monetize the values protected by these norms. In other words, where it
is difficult, if not impossible, to put a price on an entitlement (to, for example, freedom or
the survival of an ethnic group), it makes sense to altogether ban the transfer of that
entitlement.

Importantly, however, also the rationale of significant externalities might apply to
international entitlements.

Where an activity would create such high degree of

externalities – say, dropping a nuclear bomb or wide-scale, cross-border pollution – no
one might be willing or able to pay for all the costs related to the transfer of the
entitlement. Hence, it may be more efficient to ban the transfer in the first place.

Self-paternalism, in turn, does explain why under the law of treaties fraud, corruption and
coercion render treaties invalid.74 Yet, this happens outside of the concept of jus cogens.
Self-paternalism may, however, explain why, for example, parties to the UN Law of the
Sea Convention made certain principles related to the high seas part of a so-called
“common heritage of mankind” and non-derogeable.75 According to some commentators
also the multilateral trade liberalization rules of the WTO amount to constitutional-type
norms where governments, out of self-paternalism, tie their hands to the mast of free
trade to resist the sirens of protectionism both at home and in other international treatymaking fora.76

Along similar lines, a complaint often heard by weaker countries is that bigger players
‘force’ them into bilateral agreements to either detract from earlier multilateral
agreements (such as the bilateral non-surrender agreements pushed for by the United
73
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States to shield US nationals from the Statute of the ICC), or to add to earlier multilateral
agreements (such as regional trade deals concluded by the United States or Europe where
developing countries are ‘forced’ into TRIPS-plus commitments).

Out of self-

paternalism -- that is, so as to tie their own hands to the earlier multilateral agreement -one way to deal with such complaints could be to make the entitlements under the
multilateral agreement inalienable or, at least, derogeable only within the multilateral
framework. This way, weaker countries would stop themselves from too easily selling
off their hard-fought-for multilateral entitlements in some subsequent bilateral deal. A
similar, though unsuccessful, attempt was made in the 1970s in respect of the rights of
states to their natural resources. As part of a so-called New International Economic
Order, developing countries passed resolutions, charters and declarations at the UN
General Assembly proclaiming the “full permanent sovereignty of every State over its
natural resources and all economic activities” and stating that “[n]o state may be
subjected to economic, political or any type of coercion to prevent the free and full
exercise of this inalienable right”.77 In subsequent investment arbitrations, however,
developing countries which had nationalized foreign companies or otherwise breached
contracts with foreign investors were unable to convince the tribunal that a state’s rights
over its natural resources are part of jus cogens or otherwise inalienable.78

Finally, true paternalism (of the minor-adult sort), has less traction in international law as
all states are, in principle, equal sovereigns so that few, if any, states are likely to subject
themselves to the paternalism of other states. True paternalism may, however, play out
for occupied territories or failed states. The Fourth Geneva Convention, for example,
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prohibits protected persons and occupied territories to renounce or transfer any of the
rights granted to them in the convention.79

c.

Factors unique to international law and possible alternatives

From the above examples, it is apparent that the class of inalienable entitlements under
international law could, potentially, be vast. As noted earlier, however, any attempt to
expand the list must be weighed, first, against the principles of contractual freedom and
sovereign equality of states. Before tying the hands of states or telling states that they
cannot be trusted, or trust themselves, when it comes to future treaties (say, on foreign
investment, IP or trade), the counter-balancing need for states to be able to ‘change their
minds’, contract out or make or amend earlier treaties as they see fit, must be carefully
assessed. More so than in domestic law, the freedom of states to transfer entitlements by
mutual agreement is crucial. Given the economic, social and cultural diversity between
states the scope for universally shared norms to be written in stone is limited.

Making things worse, once established, jus cogens becomes binding on all current and
future states, irrespective of whether or not they agreed to the norm in the first place.
This, obviously, creates tension with the basic rule of state consent. Moreover, once a
norm is elevated to jus cogens status it is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to change
it, even by super-majority. This lack of legislative correction stands in contrast, for
example, to domestic criminal statutes or other statutes setting out inalienable
entitlements, even domestic constitutions, which can be changed by majority or supermajority in domestic parliaments.
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Finally, and for present purposes most importantly, because of the back-up enforcement
paradox explained earlier, the promotion of a norm to jus cogens or collective obligation
status can eventually be counter-productive as, under current international law,
community obligations are backed-up with less, rather than more, enforcement. Table 1
below summarizes the arguments for and against making international entitlements
inalienable.

Table 1: When to Protect International Entitlements as Inalienable?

ARGUMENTS IN FAVOUR OF

ARGUMENTS AGAINST

INALIENABILITY

INALIENABILITY

1. Significant externalities

1. State consent

2. Moralisms

2. Contractual freedom of states

3. Self-paternalism

3. Sovereign equality of states

4. True-paternalism

4. Diversity between states
5. Lack of legislative correction
6. Weaker back-up enforcement

If the above calculus militates against inalienability, what can be done to nonetheless
enhance the protection of international entitlements considered to be worthy of the
highest levels of enforcement?

Firstly, one could strive, with renewed energy, to create solid and homogeneous polities
or communities around a set of norms, albeit at the start within a particular region. With
a genuine community in place, community obligations may be sustainable. Exactly that
is slowly happening within the European Union (where a community is emerging on a
limited geographical scale80) and, perhaps, when it comes to preventing genocide on a
80
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closer-knit communities re-negotiation rather than strict and uncompromising enforcement of the rules
may, in the long term, be more productive.
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worldwide scale (where an international community may be gradually ripening on an
issue-specific basis81).

Secondly, and quite the opposite of trying to create genuine communities, thought could
be given to accentuate the reciprocity inherent in certain norms generally considered as
fundamental or important. In the United States, for example, Congress recently decided
to impose an outright ban on torture as much out of noble feelings as for reasons of
reciprocity: if the US tortures foreigners, or is even seen as a country that condones
torture, other countries, in turn, are more likely to torture American captives. As notions
of reciprocity can make treaties largely self-enforcing, reciprocity enhances, rather than
undermines, compliance. In contrast, taking reciprocity away from a treaty regime
without replacing it with a sufficiently solid community is likely to weaken, rather than
strengthen, the effectiveness of the treaty. For that reason, critics of reciprocal trade
sanctions as the last resort mechanism to back-up WTO obligations82 ought to think twice
before replacing trade sanctions with community based mechanisms such as suspending
voting rights, monetary compensation or fines.

Thirdly, and perhaps most importantly, the most fruitful and effective means to protect
international entitlements regarded as fundamental may well be through the domestic
legal systems of states, including before domestic courts.83 As much as relative
normativity is appropriate at the international level, so is relative normativity of
international law before domestic courts.84 Put differently, rather than uniformly
incorporating or rejecting international law as part of domestic law, states should
consider giving direct effect to some rules of international law and not to others. Indeed,
to some extent, a system of communicating vessels between enforcement at the
international and the domestic level may be in place: Those norms weakly enforced at
81
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the international level (such as jus cogens or fundamental human rights), could then be
given more effect at home. For one thing, as there is less supervision and refinement of
such rules at the international level, national executives and domestic courts are given
more leeway to define, interpret and implement them domestically. In contrast, norms
strongly enforced internationally (such as WTO or investment rules under NAFTA),
could then be denied direct effect in domestic courts.85 As those rules are subject to
compulsory jurisdiction and further interpretation and refinement at the international
level, it may be wise to reduce their impact at home. Such bifurcation between types of
international norms as they play out before domestic courts can be witnessed both in the
Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain US Supreme Court opinion (giving effect to some international
law norms under the Alien Tort Statute, but not to others86), as well as in the courts of the
European Union (denying direct effect to WTO rules87, but giving direct effect to most
other international law, including scrutiny of UN Security Council resolutions under
norms of jus cogens88).

2. Why and when to protect international entitlements by property rule
versus liability rule?

a.

Property protection as the natural fall-back

As compared to both inalienability and liability protection, protecting entitlements as
property gives rise to the least amount of intervention. Since an entitlement protected by
property rule can be freely traded between a willing buyer and a willing seller, property
protection “lets each of the parties say how much the entitlement is worth to him, and
gives the seller a veto if the buyer does not offer enough”.89 In other words, the transfer
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of entitlements is simply left to voluntary negotiations. Call it the market place of
entitlements.

In many ways, property protection is naturally suited for international law. First, it
coincides with the principles of contractual freedom and sovereign equality of states and
also gives voice to the wide diversity between states. Indeed, if two states want to change
an earlier treaty or agree to settle a dispute, even in a way that is inconsistent with an
earlier treaty, why stop them? Second, since international law lacks centralized lawmaking and enforcement, the level of protection with the least amount of intervention is
logically best-suited. Indeed, if we make an international norm inalienable, who will
ensure that it is, in practice, not transferred or violated? Equally, when we let states
unilaterally take entitlements or breach treaties for as long as they pay compensation,
who will objectively determine the appropriate level of compensation and make sure that,
afterwards, compensation is actually paid? As norms of international law are based on
state consent, compulsory dispute settlement is rare (including on the question of
objectively setting levels of compensation) and back-up enforcement weak. As a result,
international law may have to content itself with letting the free market reign, that is, with
protecting entitlements as property.

b.

Domestic law analogies in favor of liability protection: Hold-outs, freeloaders and transaction costs

With the above arguments in favor of property protection, why then should we ever move
away from the free market exchange of entitlements? In the previous section (VI.1), I
discussed reasons to make entitlements inalienable (significant externalities, moralisms
and paternalism). Inalienability favors the holder of an entitlement: Even if the holder
wants to sell the entitlement, she is not permitted to do so. At the other extreme of
inalienability, one may also deviate from property protection by imposing a mere liability
rule. Liability protection favors the taker of an entitlement: Even where the holder does
not agree to transfer the entitlement, anyone can unilaterally take the entitlement on the
sole condition that the holder gets compensated. Why should we ever permit a state to
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unilaterally take the entitlement of another state without that state’s consent? At this
stage, it is useful to revert to the reasons offered by Calabresi and Melamed.

Calabresi and Melamed offer three reasons to replace property by liability protection:
hold-out, free-load and transaction costs.

First, even where the sale of entitlements is efficient (that is, the buyer values the
entitlement higher than the seller), certain sellers, or holders of the entitlement, may
refuse to sell at their ‘normal’ price in the hope of capturing more of the premium that the
buyer is willing to pay. Calabresi and Melamed use the example of eminent domain
where owners of land may hold-out in order to get a higher price from the town authority
wanting to build a park. Even though objectively the park is Pareto desirable (that is, the
town’s citizens value a park more than the land-owners value their land), with enough
hold-outs, the park will not be built. Liability protection resolves this hold-out problem:
“If society can remove from the market the valuation of each tract of land, decide the
value collectively, and impose it, then the hold-out problem is gone”.90 In other words,
under a liability rule, the town can simply take the land and compensate its owners at an
objectively determined value.

Under international law, it is easy to think of similar hold-out problems for which a
liability rule may offer a solution. If, for example, the EC wants to renegotiate the WTO
treaty so that it allows the EC to ban growth hormones in beef or genetically modified
organisms (GMOs), and the EC is perfectly willing to pay each WTO member for this
change, some WTO members may hold-out. That is, they may refuse to sign the
amendment even though they are, objectively, offered full compensation (e.g., their
exporters of beef or GMO products are fully compensated for the losses they make on the
EC market). Why so? Because in such renegotiation, WTO members – who, of course,
realize how important the proposed amendment is for the EC -- have an incentive to hide
their true valuation so as to extract ever more compensation from the EC. With enough
hold-outs, the price requested from the EC may simply kill the deal, even though
90
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objectively it should have materialized. In this situation, the market (in casu consensual
re-negotiation of the WTO treaty) fails to establish what is Pareto desirable. Moving
from a property rule (which requires consent from all sides) to a liability rule (where
entitlements can be taken unilaterally as long as compensation is paid), can then offer a
way out. Under such liability regime, the EC could then simply maintain its ban on
growth hormones and GMOs but pay each WTO member for it, at a pre-determined or
objectively set level. Although the entitlements in my example are not currently
protected in the WTO by a mere liability rule91, liability protection is exactly what
happens in respect of certain other WTO entitlements, namely: when WTO members fail
to reach agreement on proposed tariff hikes or changes in a member’s schedule of
specific commitments under GATS. Although WTO members must first attempt to reach
agreement on such proposed changes (a requirement of property protection), in the event
no agreement is made, the WTO member requesting the change can enact it unilaterally
(that is, unilaterally take entitlements from other members) subject only to a collectivelyset compensation, namely “compensatory adjustments” set by arbitration92 or the
suspension by other members of “substantially equivalent” concessions or benefits.93
91

Under my example of an EC request to amend the WTO treaty so that it allows a ban on growth
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Besides hold-out, Calabresi and Melamed offer the problem of free-load as another
reason to move from property to liability protection. While hold-out occurs on the selling
side, free-load occurs on the buying side. Going back to the example of eminent domain
and the building of a park, although the town’s citizens may each value the land at a price
that makes the sale Pareto desirable, some citizens may try to free-load. That is, they
may claim that the park is only worth $50 to them or even nothing at all (instead of the
‘true’ value to them of, say, $100). They would, of course, do so in the hope that other
citizens will chip in more and buy the land with their money, even though subsequently
everyone would benefit from the park. With enough free-loaders unwilling to pay, the
park may not materialize even though it is Pareto desirable. As with the hold-out
problem, liability protection may then offer a way out: “if society can value collectively
each individual citizen’s desire to have a park and charge him a ‘benefits’ tax based upon
it, the freeloader problem is gone. If the sum of the taxes is greater than the sum of the
compensation awards, the park will result”.94 In other words, where the entitlement of
citizens to their money is protected by mere liability, the town can simply take the
citizens’ money (that is, impose a tax) and compensate them with the creation of a park.

Moving now to international law, it is readily apparent that the basic principle of
voluntarism -- that is, states cannot be forced into an international norm or scheme
without their consent -- severely limits the way international law can deal with freeloaders. If a state decides to free-load, for example, on the commitments made by other
countries to cut emissions under the Kyoto Protocol, there is nothing that international
law can do to force these free-loaders to join the Kyoto Protocol. In the absence of
centralized power, no one can, for example, force the United States or China to pay an
emissions tax. The only thing that existing Kyoto Protocol members can do is lure nonparties into joining, a process referred to by Wiener as the “beneficiary pays” principle
(instead of the traditional “polluter pays” principle).95 In this sense, at least one of the
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traditional reasons offered in domestic law in favor of liability rules is hard to apply in
international law.96

Why can international law deal with hold-outs but not with free-loaders? In essence
because international law has a hard time to either (1) stop a country from doing
something (that is, in the face of hold-outs, who will stop the EC from unilaterally taking
another country’s entitlement to trade in GMOs?) or (2) force a country to do something
(that is, who can force the United States or China to limit emissions or pay a pollution tax
against their will?). Put differently, international law can overrule hold-outs because it is
largely powerless to stop countries from taking other countries’ entitlements. Yet,
international law cannot normally resolve the free-load problem as it is largely powerless
to force countries to give up entitlements.

A third reason that Calabresi and Melamed offer to shift from property to liability
protection is high, or even prohibitive, transaction costs. They give the example of
accidents and how it would be extremely expensive, if not prohibitive, to protect a
victim’s entitlement not to be accidentally injured as property. Indeed, in that case,
anyone who engages in activities that may injure others would have to negotiate with all
potential victims and buy the right, for example, “to knock off an arm or a leg”.97 Such
requirement would preclude most activities that involve risk, even though these activities
may, from an overall-welfare perspective, be worth having (ranging from driving cars to
using certain machinery).

Much like hold-outs and free-loads, the problem of high transaction costs can be resolved
through liability protection. As Calabresi and Melamed note, “perhaps the most common
[reason], for employing a liability rule rather than a property rule to protect an
entitlement is that market valuation of the entitlement is deemed inefficient, that is, it is
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either unavailable or too expensive compared to a collective valuation”.98 Hence, instead
of forcing risk-takers to negotiate ex ante a deal with all potential victims, in domestic
law, the entitlement of people to be free from accidental injury is protected by a liability
rule. As a result, the risk-taker can simply take the entitlement (i.e., cause an accident)
but will then have to compensate the victim.

Turning now to international law, the closest analogy to liability protection based on high
transaction costs is liability for cross-border environmental damage. Although
international law does not prohibit all activities that may cause cross-border damage, it
does impose “a general duty on the part of a state to protect other states from injurious
acts by individuals within its jurisdiction”.99 Along these lines, since 1970 the UN’s
International Law Commission (ILC) is examining further rules on what it calls
“International Liability for Injurious Consequences Arising out of Acts not Prohibited by
International Law”.100 States may, therefore, have an entitlement to be free from certain
injury. However, other states can take this entitlement, without prior agreement, for as
long as they pay compensation to the injured party.101 As in domestic law, the reason to
thus permit states to unilaterally take entitlements is that, otherwise, states would need to
negotiate compensation agreements ex ante with each and every possible victim, before
they engage in any risky activity. To impose property protection in this type of situation
could prevent a lot of risky but overall desirable activities.

Crucially, however, the argument of high transaction costs as a reason for liability
protection carries less weight at the international level than it does domestically. As there
are, after all, only 191 states and only so many countries that are neighboring on a
98

Idem, p. 1110.
ALEXANDRE KISS AND DINAH SHELTON, INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (3rd edition, 2003), p.
184, referring to the famous Trail Smelter arbitration (3 U.N. RIAA 1938, 1965).
100
See Alan Boyle, Codification of International Environmental Law and the International Law
Commission: Injurious Consequences Revisited, in ALAN BOYLE AND DAVID FREESTONE (EDS.),
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT, PAST ACHIEVEMENTS AND FUTURE CHALLENGES
(1999).
101
See, for example, the Convention on Civil Liability for Damage Resulting from Activities Dangerous to
the Environment, in PATRICIA BIRNIE AND ALAN BOYLE, BASIC DOCUMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
THE ENVIRONMENT (1995), p. 132. Many environmental treaties do, however, also require advance
notification and consultation, risk assessments and the enactment of precautionary measures. See Kiss and
Shelton, supra note 99 at 188-223.
99

47
specific country, it is, in many cases, possible and not prohibitively expensive to have ex
ante negotiations with all potential victims. In contrast, when, for example, driving a car
under domestic law the number of potential victims runs in the thousands, if not millions,
and ex ante negotiations are, effectively, impossible. In the WTO, for example, any
member who wants to change the rules (that is, ‘buy’ certain entitlements from other
members) will, indeed, need to negotiate with all other WTO members. Even if there are
now 150 WTO members, and the transaction costs of conducting negotiations with 149
different countries are no doubt high, these costs remain relatively low as compared to
negotiating with thousands of potential victims every time you drive your car.

c.

International arguments in favor of liability protection: incomplete
contracting, legitimacy deficit, attracting participation and preventing exit

Besides the above arguments for and against liability protection derived from domestic
law analogies, crucial, new debates arise in the international context. On the one hand,
when it comes to international entitlements, one can think of novel reasons in favor of
liability protection. On the other hand, arguments -- unique to international law -- in
favor of property protection come to mind. This sub-section focuses on the latter (in
favor of liability). The next sub-section deals with the former (in favor of property). At
the end of Section VI, Table 2 provides an overview of all core arguments.

Starting with possible arguments in favor of liability protection that are special or unique
to international law consider, first, the fact that most international agreements are
incomplete contracts. This is the case both because negotiators cannot foresee all
situations and because, quite often, they can only agree on a vague compromise (given
the high number of countries involved and/or diversities in state preferences).102 Given
this incompleteness of the treaty, there is a risk that states are faced with unexpected or
unacceptable restrictions in the future.103 As a result, negotiators may want to set up
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devices that allow each party to breach the treaty subject to fully compensating any
victims. In other words, they may want to permit breach in cases where the costs of
performance exceed the benefits of performance. One way to do so is by protecting the
entitlements in the treaty by a mere liability rule. As Downs and Rocke note in respect of
the GATT, “GATT’s weak enforcement norm is a result of uncertainty about the future
demands of interest groups. States do not want aggressive enforcement of the GATT
because most of them knew that they themselves would eventually find it advantageous
to depart from the free trade standard”.104

Second, and related, given the at times low level of democratic legitimacy of
international norms, liability protection may offer a welcome democratic safety-valve.
International norms may suffer a legitimacy deficit be it because they are treaties little
scrutinized by domestic parliaments (or even ratified solely by dictatorial regimes),
decisions by international organizations that are not necessarily representative (such as,
from the perspective of some countries, the UN Security Council or the UN Human
Rights Commission) or custom created by lower level officials. In such event, to force
countries to perform the norm or to obtain agreement of all other parties to change it (i.e.,
protecting it by a property rule), may go too far. Instead, permitting countries to deviate
for as long as they compensate (liability protection) may then offer an important
democratic safeguard. A similar argument could be made if one believes that current
international law is lopsided in favor of economic globalization and lags behind in
environmental and social globalization. To avoid an even bigger divide one could then
argue that, for example, trade and investment agreements should only be protected by a
liability rule. To force specific performance with such agreements (i.e., protect them as
property), in the absence of effective treaties in non-economic areas, would then, the
argument could go, only aggravate international law’s lopsidedness. If so, only once

where the bargain on a particular issue is initially beneficial, changing circumstances may make it
politically unappealing”.
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stronger rules materialize in the non-economic sector should stronger protection of trade
and investment entitlements follow.

Third, to permit states to breach a treaty subject only to compensation may be a way to
attract broader participation in the treaty as well as a means to prevent exit from the treaty
when a state is found to be in violation. As noted earlier105, attracting participation and
preventing exit largely explain the low levels of back-up enforcement in international
law. The same arguments can be made in support of protecting international entitlements
by a mere liability rule.

d.

International arguments in favor of property protection: lack and cost/error
of collective valuation, reputation costs, credible commitments, stability,
states as non-unitary actors and power inequalities

In domestic contract law, with unitary actors and a centralized court system to set and
enforce compensation, liability protection and the idea of stimulating so-called efficient
breach can be attractive. If no one suffers and society is overall better off, why not
permit breach for as long as the victim is fully compensated? In other words, why not
allow a party to ‘buy its way out’ if the cost of its performance is higher than the victim’s
– compensated -- loss caused by breach?

As pointed out earlier, before moving from property to liability protection under
international law, the buyer’s argument of, for example, hold-outs or high transaction
costs must be balanced by the seller’s right to contractual freedom and sovereign
equality. Put differently, before giving a state the right to unilaterally take another state’s
entitlement (liability protection), attention must be paid to that other state’s insistence
that, normally, its entitlements should only be taken with its consent (property
protection).106 More so than is the case for individuals under domestic law, the principles
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of contractual freedom, sovereignty, equality and consent form the bedrock of
international law.

In addition, before opting for liability protection – be it because of hold-outs, transaction
costs, incomplete contracting or legitimacy deficits – account must be taken of certain
costs traditionally linked to the collective valuation of entitlements107: First, the
difficulty and/or cost of setting up and running a court system that objectively values
entitlements. Second, the errors made by such court system in assessing the true value of
an entitlement to its holder. In international law both of these costs can be significant
arguments against liability protection.

As noted earlier, given the absence of centralized enforcement – there is no international
court or tribunal that states can automatically resort to for compensation in case their
entitlements are taken – in most cases liability protection is out of the question. Without
a collective valuation system, liability protection risks, indeed, to amount to the law of
the jungle: Yes, states could then take entitlements only if they pay for them, but without
a court to set the value of the compensation and to make sure that compensation is
actually paid, liability protection may well offer no protection at all. Besides
overshooting and the importance of reputation costs (discussed earlier108), this lack of a
reliable collective valuation system is an important reason why international law, by
default, protects entitlements as property. It also explains why we are most likely to
witness liability protection in those regimes of international law that are most legalized,
that is, which benefit from a strong dispute settlement mechanism and efficient back-up
enforcement. A prime example is investor protection under NAFTA Chapter 11 (and
most bilateral investment treaties). Under NAFTA Chapter 11, investor entitlements are,
indeed, not protected as property: States cannot be forced to, for example, withdraw an
work of its 53th session, Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifty-sixth session, Supplement No. 10
(A/56/10), chp. V.E.1). Although the ILC articles apply to “activities not prohibited by international law”
(Article 1), states have an obligation “to take all appropriate measures to prevent significant transboundary
harm or at any event to minimize the risk thereof” (Article 3), to “require prior authorization” (Article 6)
and to “enter into consultations” (Article 9).
107
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environmental statute or to return expropriated property. The only remedy that investors
can expect is, instead, compensation.109 NAFTA governments can, in other words,
unilaterally take an investor’s entitlement for as long as they pay compensation for it. In
sum, NAFTA Chapter 11 entitlements are protected by a liability rule, not a property
rule. This was made possible largely because NAFTA Chapter 11 includes a compulsory
investor-state dispute settlement system which offers collective valuation. Importantly,
this system is supported by efficient back-up enforcement, namely domestic courts which
have an obligation to recognize and enforce NAFTA Chapter 11 awards. A similar
mechanism is at work for investor-state arbitration awards under the World Bank’s
ICSID Convention.110 As compulsory dispute settlement is now available at the WTO,
liability protection of WTO entitlements has equally become more feasible. Witness, for
example, the renegotiation procedures under GATS where, in the absence of agreement, a
WTO member may unilaterally take entitlements for as long as it pays collectively
determined compensation or suffers equivalent retaliation.111

Turning now to the costs and possible errors of collective valuation -- even where
international law does provide a valuation mechanism -- additional arguments against
liability protection emerge. First, to put a monetary value on harm done to a state, as
109

NAFTA Article 1134.1: “Where a Tribunal makes a final award against a Party, the Tribunal may
award only:(a) monetary damages, and any applicable interest; or(b) restitution of property, in which case
the award shall provide that the disputing Party may pay monetary damages, and any applicable interest, in
lieu of restitution.
110
ICSID tribunals are unlikely to award specific performance and, instead, remain focused on
compensation. To that extent, they offer liability, not property, protection. Yet, such liability protection
was made possible because of a strong dispute settlement mechanism including, specifically, automatic
enforcement before domestic courts of any money awards. See Article 54.1 of the ICSID Convention:
“Each Contracting State shall recognize an award rendered pursuant to this Convention as binding and
enforce the pecuniary obligations imposed by that award within its territories as if it were a final judgment
of a court in that State” (underlining added).
111
See GATS Article XXI and supra notes 92-93. At the same time, note that since its foundation in 1947
the GATT already had liability rules in place (such as Article XXVIII on tariff renegotiations) and this
without strong dispute settlement. Yet, this is easily explained by an element that makes trade largely sui
generis and, in a way, better suited to liability protection. In trade agreements, the compensation which is
so crucial for liability protection is not in the hands of the wrongdoer. That is, international law is not
tasked here with the problem of forcing a country to pay compensation. Rather, because of the reciprocity
underlying trade agreements, compensation is in the hands of the victim: it takes the form of the victim
suspending trade concessions as against the wrongdoer. Although such trade retaliation may not
compensate the victim in economic terms (it would only do so in case the victim is a large country that is a
price setter), it does offer a level of compensation in political terms (see supra note 93). Hence, in trade
agreements, to permit a state to unilaterally take another state’s entitlement subject to compensation can
work and does not pose the usual problem of lack of back-up enforcement in international law.

52
opposed to an individual, can be difficult, especially when it comes to consolidated harm
to potentially thousands of people (many of whom may have different interests) or
largely intangible harm caused by, for example, infringements of a state’s sovereignty or
airspace.112 Since states are not unitary actors, the taking of an entitlement may also
harm some individuals within the state but benefit others, raising the question of whether
compensation must be based on overall welfare losses or simply the losses caused to
some groups within a state.113 Moreover, given the economic, social and cultural
diversity between states, the value of entitlements held by states is likely to be subjective
and may therefore vary widely between countries. Any attempt to objectively value a
state’s entitlement, in particular when such is done exclusively by foreign judges, may
therefore include serious errors of under- or over-valuation. Where compensation levels
are under-valued, the transfer of entitlements is not Pareto desirable and may be overall
inefficient (that is, the losses of the seller may not be compensated by buyer gains).
Equally, where courts over-value compensations, they may deter efficient breach.

In this context, the limited evidence available of international arbitrations that do attempt
to objectively set compensation indicates that in most cases there is a tendency to undervalue compensation. This is the case, for example, in WTO arbitrations tasked to set the
permissible level of trade retaliation in response to breach of the WTO treaty.114 This
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tendency to put conservative estimates on harm is no doubt inspired by a high degree of
deference by international courts to the sovereignty of states. Where the tribunal already
intruded on this sovereignty by finding a violation, it is often naturally inclined to
somewhat make-up for this intrusion by low-balling the compensation to be paid for the
violation. The same conservative valuations are witnessed in investor-state arbitrations
and before the International Court of Justice.

For additional arguments, unique to international law, in favor of property protection,
recall further the discussion above on why international entitlements are currently
protected, by default, as property.115 First, international law may be overshooting in its
ambitions, e.g., prescribe specific performance, knowing far too well that achieving
liability protection would already be a success (remember the analogy of setting a speed
limit at 40 MPH in the hope of reducing actual speed to 60 MPF). Second, and crucially
important, international law may opt for property protection, that is, demand performance
or agreement on a renegotiation or settlement, to trigger reputation and normative costs in
case states do breach international law.

As pointed out earlier, more than anything else, reputation costs are what drive
compliance. However, under a liability regime those costs are basically wiped out.
Indeed, under a liability rule no shame or blame is linked to breach for as long as it is
accompanied by compensation. Yet, shame and blame is exactly what international law
needs the most to induce compliance. This is why, for example, most WTO entitlements
(other than tariffs and GATS specific commitments) are protected by a property rule116
and why in all but a handful of WTO disputes the WTO dispute mechanism – whose last
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resort is, after all, merely the suspension of equivalent concessions -- was able to induce
compliance, not merely compensatory trade suspensions (indeed, in no single case was
such trade suspension regarded as ‘efficient breach’ that ended the dispute). Even if
property protection may, eventually, only achieve the equivalent of liability protection
(i.e., compensation), it does so because the goal is set at the higher level of compliance.
It is the reputation and other costs of non-compliance that lead to compensation. Without
those costs (i.e., if one were to openly install a mere liability regime) this, for some,
disappointing level of liability protection would not even be met. In this sense, it does
matter what you wish for: Because the goal of international law is, by default,
compliance, it is able to achieve, in most cases, at least compensation. For that reason it
is, in most situations, crucial for international law to ‘keep up appearances’ and to insist
on property protection even if it knows that, in some instances, only compensation (and
not performance) will follow.

In addition, without property protection, one of the core functions of international law
may be endangered, namely offering countries a means to make credible commitments.
If negotiators know that parties can subsequently walk away from the treaty by merely
paying compensation, any commitments made will lose credibility, both at home and
internationally. As against domestic audiences, tying one’s hands to an international
treaty becomes less credible when everyone knows that the government can anyhow buy
its way out of the treaty. In rough times (e.g. in the face of temporary protectionist
pressures) governments may then have a hard time to stick to the treaty. As against
foreign partners, treaty commitments protected by liability equally lose credibility. Over
time it may even inhibit countries from signing treaties in the first place: with past
experiences of ‘buy outs’, why would you believe this time that a government will keep
its promise?

Moreover, much more so than individuals under contract law, when states operate under
international law, one of their main objectives is to create stable and predictable
relationships. States do not engage in one-time contacts. They are repeat players and
necessarily interact and contract in a variety of fields (from national security to trade and
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health). Moreover, unlike individuals under contract law, states are not unitary actors
either. Whereas the calculus of efficient breach is relatively easy where two individuals
have signed a contract -- e.g., do I still gain if I just pay you out instead of fulfilling my
promise to, for example, paint your house? --, the calculus of states driven by a multitude
of incentives and interest groups is far more complex.117 In particular, the situation
where I pay you to get someone else paint your house – contrary to my earlier contractual
promise -- whilst I engage in more lucrative activity such as law school teaching, makes
sense. In contrast, the wash is more difficult to see where, for example, the United States
vindicates its right to export GMOs to the EC in WTO dispute settlement, but then gets
compensated with a tariff reduction on computer exports to the EC or the right to increase
tariffs on EC textile imports. The bottom line is that US farmers are simply not
compensated by more computer exports nor by less imports of textiles. For them, and
indirectly also for the US government representing them, breach cum compensation is not
the economic equivalent of compliance. This explains why no WTO complainant so far
has rested its case upon receipt of trade compensation or trade suspensions. Equally,
from the EC perspective, it is difficult to balance a continued ban on US GMOs with a
concession of more computer imports or less textiles exports. The bottom line is that EC
computer producers and EC textiles exporters are simply not willing to pay the bill for
EC farmers and EC consumers averse to GMOs. For them, and indirectly also for the EC
governments representing them, breach cum compensation is not the economic equivalent
of compliance. This, in turn, explains why no WTO defendant so far has been able to end
a case against it by sacrificing export interests in some other sector.

Finally, in fora where liability protection has been openly proposed (such as the WTO)
the main recurring counter-argument has been that it would alter the balance in favor of
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For example, in the WTO steel dispute, the United States was driven to impose additional tariffs on steel
imports by the domestic US steel industry. In the original battle over whether or not to impose the tariffs,
the domestic steel industry won over domestic steel consumers (such as the US car industry that buys a lot
of steel). Yet, once the WTO had condemned the tariff as a breach of the WTO treaty, and authorized trade
retaliation on US exports of, among other things, Florida orange juice and North Carolina textiles, the
domestic balance of interests shifted. Because of the additional weight added by Florida orange growers
and North Carolina textile mills against the tariffs (weight that was added to the original opposition by US
steel consumers), the Bush administration eventually gave up on the US steel industry and withdrew the
tariff. This shows how a state’s interests are not unitary but multi-faceted, nor static but changing over
time.
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the rich and powerful countries. Indeed, the right to unilaterally take entitlements of
other countries on condition that one pays for it (the hallmark of liability protection) is
likely to be invoked mainly, if not exclusively, by those countries who have the economic
and/or political means to ‘buy off’ their obligations.118 Few developing countries, for
example, have the capital, economic or otherwise, to ‘buy off’ trading rights from other
countries, let alone from powerful partners such as the EC or the US.119

e.

Conclusion on property rules versus liability rules

It was not the goal of this section to conclude in favor of either liability or property
protection for international law. Instead, the aim was to set out factors and arguments for
and against either of these regimes. Table 2 below summarizes this assessment.
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Crucially, however, compensation as an alternative to compliance (under a liability rule) must be
distinguished from compensation as one of several remedies to induce compliance (under a property rule).
Even though WTO members often confuse the two, only compensation as an alternative to compliance
attracts the arguments discussed here against liability protection.
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This fear of rich nations buying off obligations is arguably one of the main reasons why the multilateral
trading system evolved from liability protection under GATT to property protection under the WTO. In
1947, when the GATT was created, few of the 23 participants were developing countries. In contrast, in
the WTO, more than three quarters of the membership are developing countries. As noted earlier,
developing countries are strong proponents of legalization and property protection, if only to level the
political imbalance between them and developed nations.
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Table 2:

When to Protect International Entitlements by Property or Liability Rule?

ARGUMENTS IN FAVOUR

ARGUMENTS IN FAVOUR

OF A PROPERTY RULE

OF A LIABILITY RULE

1. Contractual freedom of states

1. Hold-outs

2. Sovereign equality and diversity of states 2. Free-loaders
3. Lack of centralized law-making and

3. Transaction costs

enforcement
4. Absence of collective valuation

4. Efficient breach

mechanism
5. Costs of collective valuation including

5. Incomplete contracting

error and tendency to under-value
6. Attract reputation and normative costs

6. Legitimacy deficit and lopsidedness of
international law

7. Enable credible commitments

7. Attract participation and prevent exit

8. Importance of stability and predictability
9. States as non-unitary actors
10. Buy-out option favors powerful states

At the same time, the evaluation above does tilt in favor of property protection, at least
when considering the current state of international law. Two factors, in particular,
militate for a default rule of property protection, that is, the rule we witness lex lata:
•

The general lack of an efficient and effective collective valuation system, a
sine qua non to set and collect compensation under a liability rule scheme.

•

The need to create reputation and normative costs to compensate for weak
back-up enforcement, crucial costs to induce some degree of compliance
which would not be triggered under a liability rule.

58
As a result, and coming back to the paradox described in Section V.1 (international law,
an inherently weak system, protects its entitlements more strongly than most domestic
law regimes do), it is largely because of – not despite -- the weaknesses of international
law that international entitlements are, by default, protected as property. In other words,
it is because of the absence of a collective valuation mechanism and because of weak
back-up enforcement instruments (necessitating reputation costs to induce some level of
compliance) that a liability rule under current international law is unlikely to work.
These weaknesses of international law do not stop, or prevent it, from the relatively high
level of property protection. Rather it is those weaknesses that explain the prevalence of
property protection.

At the same time, many of the arguments in favor of liability protection can be addressed
within the current property regime of international law. In particular, the need for safetyvalves in the face of incomplete contracts or rules of international law that lack
legitimacy can be met at the subsequent stage of back-up enforcement. Indeed, even
where international law protects entitlements as property, the instruments of back-up
enforcement in case states break the rules of protection are weak (ultimately, only
proportional countermeasures). In the WTO, for example, most entitlements are
protected as property.120 Yet, when a WTO member refuses to perform, the only back-up
enforcement that member can face is equivalent trade suspensions (excluding
compensation for past harm). Thus, ample scope remains for safety-valves or states
continuing to breach their obligations in the subsequent stage of back-up enforcement.
To move this flexibility up to the rules of protection themselves, i.e., to openly allow
countries to ‘buy off’ WTO obligations, would keep the same safety-valves in place
which are, in practice, already there through weak back-up enforcement. At the same
time, however, doing so would remove the system’s main tool to induce compliance,
namely reputation and normative costs created by the WTO finding a country to be in
breach. A move to liability protection would, therefore, seriously upset the current,
carefully constructed balance between, on the one hand, providing incentives to comply
(in particular, through reputation costs) and, on the other hand, offering limited safety
120
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valves that allow for non-compliance (in particular, through weak back-up enforcement).
This imbalance would, in turn, undermine the possibility for WTO members to make
credible commitments, threaten one of the core objectives of the trading system, namely,
stability and predictability, and risk tipping the balance against developing countries who
would find it much more difficult to ‘buy off’ their obligations.

Moreover, besides weak back-up enforcement, an additional mechanism is available to
soften problems of incomplete contracting and legitimacy deficits (arguments in favor of
liability protection pointed out earlier), namely at the stage where international law
reaches the domestic legal system. As noted earlier, as much as weak enforcement of jus
cogens at the international level can be compensated by giving direct effect to jus cogens
in domestic courts, so can strong enforcement of, for example, WTO law be offset with
the safety-valve or buffer of not giving direct effect to WTO rules and rulings before
domestic courts.121 This is exactly what both US and EC courts are doing: so as not to tie
the hands of their executives too much, these courts have refused to give direct effect to
both WTO rules and rulings in WTO dispute settlement. In the US, for example, the
administration has consistently referred to the absence of direct effect as proof that the
US maintains its sovereignty, at least in the sense that the WTO cannot ever change US
federal or state laws: As WTO law has no direct effect, such changes can happen only if
the US, or US states, themselves make their own decision to that effect.122

That said, as international law further develops and matures, the scope for liability
protection ought to increase. On condition that a reliable collective valuation mechanism
is made available – or where compensation is left in the hands of the victim itself, as is
the case for trade agreements123 – in particular hold-outs, high transaction costs and
incomplete contracting may justify liability protection. In the WTO, for example, tariffs
and GATS specific commitments are protected by a liability rule. Yet, the fact that so far
very few countries have taken advantage of this possibility to change their commitments
subject only to compensation or equivalent trade suspensions, indicates that it is, at best,
121
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a safety-valve for extreme cases, not evidence that the WTO’s goal is to systematically
avoid compliance there where compliance is costlier than breach. The arguments noted
earlier of enabling credible commitments, the importance of stability and predictability to
international law, the non-unitary nature of states and the fear that liability protection
would favor powerful countries, may well explain the reluctance of WTO members to
withdraw commitments under these liability rules.

Another, and arguably better, example of workable liability rules is the Kyoto Protocol
which caps the total emissions of greenhouse gases by certain participating countries124,
but then allows those countries, as well as industries within those countries, to trade in
emission rights.125 In other words, within pre-set limits, countries or industries can
pollute for as long as they ‘pay for it’, in the form of buying emission allowances. The
core advantage of such mechanism of tradeable allowances is economic efficiency (in
other words, polluting but buying emission allowances from someone who can abate
more cheaply that you can, constitutes ‘efficient breach’). Indeed, where emissions
automatically affect all countries (as in global warming) and abatement costs vary
between countries and industries, a system of tradeable quantity limits will obtain a
certain level of abatement at the lowest possible cost. As Wiener explains, in such
system “[e]ach source abates up to the point that its marginal costs of abatement equals
the market price for an allowance to cover the next unit of emissions. High-cost abaters
undertake less abatement and buy more allowances; low-cost abaters undertake more
abatement and sell allowances”.126 In this case, liability protection works because it
achieves abatement most efficiently, but also, and for present purposes most importantly,
because a reliable collective valuation mechanism is made available, namely a private
market place for emission allowances. Moreover, liability protection is, in this situation,
embedded in a property regime in the sense that the number of emission allowances is
capped. Hence, at the end of a certain period, overall world targets must be met (no ‘buy
out’ is possible in this respect) and each country must either meet its emission reduction
targets or present emission allowances for any short-fall. In addition, the mechanism
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avoids the difficulty related to states as non-unitary actors by delegating emissions
trading to private industries. It also bypasses the traditional objection of developing
countries against liability schemes by not imposing emission reductions on them and
letting developing countries operate as sellers, and thus beneficiaries, of emissions
allowances (under the so-called clean development mechanism, for example, developed
countries who invest in developing countries so as to reduce emissions there, obtain
emission credits127).

Finally, similar factors explain why investment agreements operate under a liability rule
(under NAFTA Chapter 11, for example, governments can only be forced to pay
compensation, not to, for example, withdraw an environmental regulation or to return
expropriated property). First, the system provides an effective collective valuation
mechanism, in the form of international tribunals whose money awards are, crucially,
directly binding on and enforceable before domestic courts. Second, the usual need for
stability and predictability in inter-state relations, as well as the problem of states as nonunitary actors, is softened by deflecting complaints from states to private investors who
have standing to sue foreign governments directly.

In sum, whilst property protection may well remain the fall-back, as international law
further develops and strengthens, both inalienability and liability protection will
gradually become more feasible. As both deviations require higher degrees of
community, in particular community enforcement or a collective valuation mechanism,
both inalienability and liability protection are more likely to emerge with stronger
international law based on more cohesive geographical or subject-specific polities.
Equally, both inalienability and liability protection can be fostered by more involvement
of domestic courts, be it to apply jus cogens or to enforce money awards under NAFTA
Chapter 11.
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VII. Conclusion
Any system of law that either uniformly requires performance in all cases, or regards its
norms as mere pledges, cannot be taken seriously. Yet, this is, respectively, what
European absolutism and American voluntarism – as I defined it (in Section II) -- would
have us believe represents international law. Both schools are, however, wrong. To fully
appreciate why, one must transcend the by now hollow debate between traditional
supporters and traditional critics of international law. Both of these camps wrongly
portray law and normativity as homogeneous concepts, representing a simple binary
choice between law and not-law. Yet, this is not how even the most sophisticated
systems of domestic law operate. On the contrary, domestic law comes in different
shades. As international law further develops and matures, it should follow suit.

One such form of gradation is based on the distinction between allocating entitlements,
protecting entitlements and back-up enforcement (Section III). In particular, a clear
distinction must be made between the second step of how to protect entitlements (i.e., as
either inalienable or by a property or liability rule?) and the third step of how to react
when rules of protection are flouted (e.g., with imprisonment, fines, retaliation or simply
compensation?). So far, international law scholars have given little thought to this
distinction or confused the second step with the third.

In WTO circles, for example, a debate rages as to whether adverse rulings of the WTO
Appellate Body impose a legal obligation to comply with WTO rules (as John Jackson
has argued128) or whether, in contrast, WTO members have the right to ‘buy off’ their
obligations with trade compensation or by suffering trade retaliation (the position of, in
particular, Alan Sykes129). Within the paradigm presented in this article, both positions
carry weight but only so because both confuse the steps of how international law protects
and enforces entitlements. Jackson is correct that, as a matter of how the WTO protects
entitlements (the second step referred to earlier), the WTO operates under a property rule,
128
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that is, given the default rule of protection in international law, confirmed in the language
of the DSU itself, WTO members are under a legal obligation to comply with WTO
rulings.130 Other than for tariffs and GATS specific commitments, WTO members
cannot unilaterally take entitlements, pay compensation for them, and thereby end a
dispute. At the same time, however, Sykes is equally correct that WTO members have,
as a matter of how the WTO reacts when a WTO member flouts the rule of property
protection (the third step referred to earlier), the option to simply pay trade compensation
or suffer equivalent trade retaliation. Although, by doing so, the WTO member does not
fulfill its ultimate legal obligation of compliance (second step), given the WTO’s weak
back-up enforcement (third step), a WTO member can, in practice, avoid compliance
through compensation or retaliation. Sykes is also correct to regard this relatively weak
back-up enforcement as a welcome safety-valve instead of a birth defect that needs cure.
Equally important, Jackson’s position that WTO rulings must be complied with (property
protection) should not be read to mean that WTO entitlements are protected as
inalienable. As is the case for property protection more generally, WTO rules are not
written in stone. As a result, WTO members can settle a dispute131 or change WTO
rules132 for as long as mutual agreement is found.

In contrast to my caricature of European absolutism, only a very select group of
international entitlements are protected as inalienable (jus cogens) (Section IV.1).
Moreover, unlike the extreme of what I called American voluntarism, international law
is, by default, protected by a property rule, not a liability rule: Its goal is restitution or
specific performance, not compensation or efficient breach (Section IV.2).

In terms of the third step of back-up enforcement, current international law presents an
intriguing double paradox (Section V). First, although international law is more
ambitious in its default level of protection as compared to most domestic legal systems
(property versus liability protection), back-up enforcement in international law is actually
weaker (ultimately, merely proportional countermeasures). I explained this paradox,
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first, with reference to what I called overshooting and, second, based on the importance
of reputation and normative costs for inducing compliance with international law. As
these costs would not be triggered under a mere liability rule, current international law is,
by default, protected as property. Property protection is, moreover, naturally suited for
international law given, in particular, the principles of state consent and sovereign
equality, as well as the general absence in current international law of an effective
collective valuation mechanism, a sine qua non for liability protection.

The second paradox of back-up enforcement under current international law is this: The
entitlements that international law protects most strongly (what I called community
obligations, namely jus cogens and obligations erga omnes partes) benefit from the
weakest form of back-up enforcement (in particular, no reciprocal suspensions nor
countermeasures unless one is individually affected). Indeed, most community
obligations -- such as the prohibition of genocide, core labor standards and fundamental
human rights -- currently experience the worst of both worlds: They lack an effective
community-based enforcement mechanism (be it under general international law or
specific treaty regimes) and, on top of that, are deprived from the normal back-up of
individual enforcement, be it reciprocal suspension or countermeasures. In this sense at
least, and quite paradoxically, the actual protection of international entitlements is
inversely related to how strongly international law aims or pretends to be protecting the
entitlement.

Normatively speaking, therefore, when setting the optimal level of protection for
international entitlements, one must be careful what one wishes for. Although
externalities, moralisms and paternalism may be arguments to make certain international
entitlements inalienable, such arguments must be balanced by, in particular, the
contractual freedom and sovereign equality of states and, most importantly, the generally
weaker back-up enforcement available for community obligations. Hence, when, for
example, supporters of the WTO advocate the promotion of WTO norms from reciprocal
obligations to collective or erga omnes partes obligations133, they must be careful what
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they wish for. Although they might be inspired by noble thoughts about how important
trade is and, therefore, how counterintuitive it is to uphold a trade system with reciprocal
trade sanctions, collectivizing the WTO risk undermining rather than strengthening the
system: Taking reciprocity away from a treaty regime without replacing it with a
sufficiently solid community may actually weaken rather than strengthen the
effectiveness of the treaty.

Equally, when making a choice between property and liability protection, what you wish
for matters. Given the importance of reputation and normative costs as factors to induce
compliance, setting the goal at performance – instead of openly permitting breach cum
compensation – is crucial. To attract those costs and because states value stability, need
to make credible commitments and are non-unitary actors with widely divergent political
power, property protection is, by default, best suited for international law. Indeed, a
system without compulsory dispute settlement, in particular, without an effective
collective valuation system to set and enforce compensation levels, is unlikely to support
liability protection.

Fortunately, and further supporting property protection, some of the strongest arguments
in favor of a liability rule -- such as incomplete contracting, legitimacy deficits,
attracting participation and preventing exit – can be taken care of in the subsequent stages
of back-up enforcement and deciding what effect to give to international law before
domestic courts. More specifically, international law’s weak back-up enforcement
(ultimately only proportional countermeasures) and/or denying direct effect to
international rules and rulings, can offer the democratic and other safety-valves sought
after.

Yet, as international law further develops and strengthens, and establishes closer ties with
domestic legal systems and courts, liability protection – like inalienability -- may become
more feasible (as witnessed in NAFTA Chapter 11 and emissions trading under the
Kyoto Protocol). As in domestic law, in particular, hold-outs and high transaction costs
can then justify liability, instead of property, protection.

